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Sex and Economics: The Tie That Binds
Judicial Approaches to Sexual Harassment
as a Title VII Violation
Lynn Rubinett*
I. Introduction
Women have experienced and reacted to sexual coercion at
work for as long as they have traded their labor for a wage.' Yet
the term "sexual harassment" was not socially recognized or ac-
knowledged except by segments of the feminist community until
the mid-1970's. In the middle and late 1970's, the experience of
sexual harassment became widely publicized and discussed.2 Sto-
ries and reports of sexual harassment began to appear regularly in
the popular press.3 Labor organizations and personnel depart-
ments began to publish policies, procedures, and pamphlets for
employees on sexual harassment,4 and scholars began to consider
* Associate, Fickman, Van Os, Waterman, Dean & Moore, P.C., Austin,
Texas. B.A., Stanford University, 1979; J.D., Northeastern University School of
Law, 1985. The author wishes to thank Judith Olans Brown, Phyllis L. Crocker,
and Richard Levy. Their substantial assistance was invaluable in the preparation of
this article.
1. The term "wage" is meant to include what women receive in return for
both productive and nonproductive labor. Thus sexual harassment has historically
occurred in economic relations both within the labor force and the home. For a dis-
cussion of the history of sexual harassment, see generally Constance Backhouse &
Leah Z. Cohen, Sexual Harassment On The Job 46-64 (1981); Lin Farley, Sexual
Shakedown: The Sexual Harassment of Women on the Job 34-44 (1978); Mary Bu-
larzik, Sexual Harassment at the Workplace: Historical Notes, Radical Am., July-
Aug. 1978, at 25; Laurie Goodman, Sexual Harassment- Some Observations on the
Distance Travelled and the Distance Yet To Go, 10 Cap. U.L. Rev. 445, 448-458
(1981).
2. The recognition of sexual harassment as a social problem in the 1970's is a
result of changing consciousness about relations between the sexes due largely to
efforts of a strong feminist movement. See Alliance Against Sexual Coercion,
Fighting Sexual Harassment: An Advocacy Handbook (1979) [hereinafter Advo-
cacy]; Linda Gordon, The Politics of Sexual Harassment, Radical Am., July-Aug.
1981, at 7.
3. See Goodman, supra note 1, at 446 n.6.
4. See, i.e., AFSCME, Sexual Harassment: On The Job Sexual Harassment:
What The Union Can Do (1980); Maine Advisory Comm'n to the U.S. Comm'n on
Civil Rights, Information Kit on Sexual Harassment in Employment (1981); Nat'l
Union of Provincial Gov't Employees, Sexual Harassment at Work (1980); Univer-
sity of Rhode Island Affirmative Action Comm. on Sexual Harassment, Sexual
Harassment and Assault: Myths and Reality (1981).
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and write about the legal and social implications of sexual harass-
ment.5 Finally, in November 1980, the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission (EEOC)6 published final guidelines on sexual
harassment which define and codify sexual harassment as an ille-
gal form of sex discrimination in violation of title VII of the 1964
Civil Rights Act.7
By 1980, the social recognition of sexual harassment was ac-
companied by judicial recognitions of sexual harassment as a legal
claim. 9 Judicial and societal definitions of sexual harassment did
not, however, share common origins or a common understanding
of the issues involved in this problem. The societal definition of
sexual harassment evolved out of the experiences of women work-
ers.10 The sexist attitudes and perceptions manifested by the har-
assment they experienced-namely, the idea that women are sex
objects first and workers second,"1 as well as the reality that men
can and do make unilateral demands for sexual attention from or
5. See Alliance Against Sexual Coercion, Sexual Harassment: An Annotated
Bibliography (1981); Beth L. Stanton, Sexual Harassment: A Bibliography, 10 Cap.
U.L. Rev. 697-708 (1981). Most notably, Catharine MacKinnon published a seminal
work entitled Sexual Harassment of Working Women (1979).
6. The EEOC is a bipartisan commission responsible for administering and en-
forcing federal antidiscrimination laws, including title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2000e-17 (1982). The EEOC's final guidelines ap-
peared in the Federal Register on November 10, 1980 and are codified at 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604.11 (1986).
7. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Guidelines on Sexual Harass-
ment, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1986). The Supreme Court has held the guidelines are
"entitled to great deference," but they do not have the force and effect of law and
need not be followed. Albemarle Paper v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975) (citation
omitted).
8. Some courts began to recognize sexual harassment as unlawful sex discrimi-
nation in the late 1970's. Only recently, however, did the Supreme Court confirm
the widely accepted view that sexual harassment in employment violates title VII
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 106 S. Ct. 2399
(1986).
9. As Catharine MacKinnon pointed out: "Sexual harassment, the experience,
is becoming sexual harassment, the legal claim. As the pain and stifled anger have
become focused into dissatisfaction, gripes have crystallized into a grievance, and
women's inner protest has become a cause of action." MacKinnon, supra note 5, at
57. MacKinnon also recognizes the courts' inability to address the social issues un-
derlying women's suffering. See infra text accompanying note 51.
10. Although some surveys indicate men experience sexual harassment, e.g.,
U.S. Merit Sys. Protection Bd. Office of Merit Review and Studies, Sexual Harass-
ment in the Federal Workplace: Is It A Problem? 34-36 (1981) [hereinafter Merit
Systems], most agree sexual harassment of women is far more common than har-
assment of men.
11. For a more complete discussion of this idea, see Advocacy, supra note 2;
Farley, supra note 1, at 33-34; MacKinnon, supra note 5, at 18-23; Barbara Gutek &
Bruce Morasch, Sex-Ratios, Sex-Role Spillover, and Sexual Harassment of Women
at Work, J. Soc. Issues, Winter 1982, at 55.
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contact with women12-shaped women workers' understanding of
sexual harassment.
In contrast, the legal definition of sexual harassment ignored
the reality of women workers' experiences. Courts reacted to
claims of sexual harassment without acknowledging or under-
standing the social conditions which created the problem. In fact,
the subtleties and pervasiveness of society's sexist attitudes, ex-
pressed through sexual harassment, are reflected in the courts'
analysis of the problem. Recurring issues reflect the tension be-
tween the courts' approach to sexual harassment and women's ex-
periences. These issues are: 1) is sexual harassment an expression
of male sexual desire gone awry or a form of sex discrimination; 2)
does sexual harassment happen to women workers because they
are women, or are male workers equally at risk; 3) must victims
suffer an economic injury or is enduring the offensive behavior
sufficient for recovery; and 4) is the employer liable for harass-
ment because it is a workplace condition or is employer liability in-
appropriate because the harassment results from an individual
man's sexual games.13
This article demonstrates that the judicial approach in fram-
ing the problem and analyzing these issues is fundamentally un-
sound. By ignoring the reality of sexual harassment as women
experience it, courts view sexual harassment as if it were aberrant
behavior rather than an ongoing and constant condition of wo-
men's work. Courts do not recognize that every instance of sexual
harassment includes both an economic and a sexual component.
Sexual harassment, by definition, means a woman's job is
threatened by sexual demands. This is, at once, both sexual and
economic coercion.
Recent judicial trends indicate a recognition that both sexual
and economic coercion are present in sexual harassment, yet
courts continue to approach harassment as a form of either sexual
or economic coercion without recognizing their inherent connec-
tion. This approach has led courts to develop two separate theories
12. See MacKinnon, supra note 5, at 149-58.
13. The Supreme Court decision in Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 206 S. Ct. 2399
(1986), resolves the first issue. The Court in Meritor stated that "[w]ithout ques-
tion, when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate because of the
subordinate's sex, that supervisor 'discriminate(s)' on the basis of sex." Id. at 2404.
In holding that there is a cause of action for environmental harassment, defined as
unwanted verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature which creates an offensive
working environment, the Meritor decision appears to resolve all of these issues.
Nevertheless, the attitudes and assumptions expressed by these issues continue to
influence the approach and analysis courts employ in the continuing development
of sexual harassment doctrine.
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of recovery for sexual harassment depending on whether the har-
assment reflects economic or sexual coercion.14
Quid pro quo sexual harassment, the first theory adopted by
the courts, allows recovery for economic coercion alone. Courts
view quid pro quo harassment as workplace-sanctioned economic
power used to pressure women sexually. The more recent theory,
environmental sexual harassment, corresponds to harassment that
courts view as primarily sex-based coercion.15 Environmental sex-
ual harassment theory developed to allow recovery for psychologi-
cal harassment that was legal under quid pro quo doctrine because
it did not result in direct economic harm to the woman worker.' 6
The theory's usefulness, however, is limited by courts' reluctance
to hold employers liable. 17 Courts view environmental harassment
as an individual man's expression of personal sexual desires,
rather than action within the scope of his employment. Because
courts assume the harasser is not wielding any workplace-sanc-
tioned authority over the woman, courts are reluctant to hold the
14. Courts have not consciously made a distinction between the economic and
sexual aspects of sexual harassment; however, recently developed approaches to the
issue reveal these underlying considerations. The new theory which focuses on sex-
based coercion as opposed to economic is called environmental sexual harassment.
For a discussion of the courts' approach to sexual harassment claims see part III,
Prima Facie Case of Sexual Harassment: Comparison of Quid Pro Quo and Envi-
ronmental Harassment Theories. Part IV, Judicial Explanations for Two Types of
Sexual Harassment, and part V, Implications of the Two-Type Model, discuss the
judicial distinction between economic coercion and sex-based coercion and the ef-
fect of these distinctions on women's legal remedy for sexual harassment.
15. See generally MacKinnon, supra note 5, at 32-47.
16. The Supreme Court's recent decision in Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 106 S.
Ct. 2399 (1986), addresses various issues raised by environmental harassment the-
ory. The plaintiff in Meritor, a former employee of the defendant bank, brought an
action against the bank and her supervisor at the bank, claiming that her supervi-
sor had sexually harassed her during her employment in violation of title VII. The
district court denied the plaintiff relief, finding that any sexual relationship the
plaintiff might have had with her supervisor had been voluntary and had not been
a condition of her employment at the bank. The District of Columbia Court of Ap-
peals reversed and remanded the case primarily because the district court had not
considered the facts of the plaintiff's situation in light of environmental sexual har-
assment theory. The Supreme Court addressed three issues on appeal: 1) was
there a cause of action for environmental sexual harassment; 2) was evidence of
plaintiff's dress and personal fantasies properly admitted at trial; and 3) what is the
proper standard for employer liability for environmental harassment by a supervi-
sor. After discussing each of these issues at length, the Court concluded that: 1) a
cause of action for environmental harassment definitely existed; 2) evidence of sex-
ually provocative speech and/or dress was relevant to determine whether the plain-
tiff found the sexual advances unwelcome; and 3) the record was not sufficiently
developed to allow the Court to issue a definitive rule on employer liability. Id. at
2401.
17. The majority opinion in Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 106 S. Ct. 2399 (1986),




employer liable unless the employer had knowledge of the harass-
ment.18 Courts are unwilling to impose liability because they un-
derstand the coercion to be sexual rather than economic.
This dichotomy allows certain types of sexual harassment to
remain illegal in name only. In other words, the judicial approach
theoretically recognizes that sexual harassment has occurred, but
still refuses to compensate the woman worker for certain scenarios
of harassment. For example, a supervisor may harass a woman
worker and create an abusive environment. If the woman does not
suffer direct economic harm as a result of the harassment, the su-
pervisor's acts are considered environmental rather than quid pro
quo sexual harassment. Under the environmental theory, the em-
ployer who lacks knowledge of the harassment will most likely es-
cape liability, even though courts do not require employer
knowledge of the harassment for a successful quid pro quo claim.
Thus, although the environmental theory recognizes this scenario
as sexual harassment, it rarely results in compensation. This is be-
cause it fails to recognize that: 1) an employer should have the
same obligation to insure that women workers have a safe work-
place environment free of abuse, regardless of whether a particu-
lar worker suffers an economic loss; and 2) supervisors exert
economic coercion and power whenever and however they harass,
regardless of the direct economic harm the woman suffers.
The two-type model of sexual harassment also ignores the
economic coercion which may be imposed on women workers by
co-workers. Courts assume that co-workers by definition can only
coerce sexually. The assumption that only supervisors can demand
sex in exchange for economic security fails to recognize ways in
which nonsupervisory male employees gain access to avenues of
control.19
18. For details on the element of employer liability, see irjfra part III, notes
176-219 and accompanying text. See also Note, Sexual Harassment Claims of Abu-
sive Work Environment Under Title VII, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1449 (1984) for sug-
gested reforms in the application of environmental sexual harassment theory.
Within the context of the quid pro quo/environmental harassment distinctions, the
author recommends using a disparate treatment standard to remove the discrimina-
tory motive requirement, and extending the quid pro quo strict liability standard to
environmentally harassing behavior by supervisors because of their employer-sanc-
tioned authority over tangible as well as intangible conditions of employment. The
author does not question the assumptions underlying the two-type model which dis-
tinguishes between sexual coercion and economic coercion. Nor does the author ar-
gue that these assumptions and distinctions make the two-type model unworkable.
19. Co-workers are frequently the harassers. In fact, the federal government
survey on sexual harassment revealed that co-worker harassment accounted for
65% of all reported incidents. See Merit Systems, supra note 10, at 57-62.
1986]
Law and Inequality
Consider the following scenario:20 Marie is the only woman
engineer in a medium-sized contracting firm. All but one of her
superiors are men and the three data technicians she supervises
are men. One of her subordinates, Joseph, began to constantly ask
Marie to sleep with him, to fondle his penis, and to go out with
him after work. Despite Marie's persistent refusals and threats to
fire him, Joseph continued to harass Marie at work and began to
call her at home and appear unexpectedly at her front door. Marie
was afraid to discipline or report Joseph because he was consid-
ered an outstanding employee, who spent many lunch and cocktail
hours with the men who ran the company. She was unsure her su-
pervisors would believe her, and she felt a truly competent super-
visor would be able to remedy the situation herself. Once Marie
realized her job performance was declining as a result of her pre-
occupation with Joseph's harassment, she decided to sleep with
him just once to "get him off her back."
In Marie's situation, general male domination in the organiza-
tion, Joseph's rapport with other men at work, and Marie's isola-
tion and lack of self-confidence combined to enable a
nonsupervisory male employee to extort sexual favors against the
threat of economic loss. Marie would be unsuccessful in a claim
brought under the quid pro quo theory because she would not be
able to show any economic harm. The environmental theory does
not provide Marie a remedy primarily because of the high stan-
dard of employer liability that results from the judicial assumption
that this is sexual and not economic harassment.2 1
This scenario points out that sexual harassment cannot be
neatly categorized into two types. Although Joseph did not utilize
"official" workplace authority to force Marie to sleep with him,
the organization of the workplace itself allowed Joseph to threaten
Marie's economic position. Male sexual power and economic
power, the factors which courts use to define environmental har-
assment and quid pro quo harassment respectively, are both pres-
ent in this scenario. Neither theory, however, provides a remedy.
This article suggests that the judicial focus on whether the
coercion expressed through sexual harassment is sexual or eco-
20. This scenario is based on a true situation faced by a client of the Alliance
Against Sexual Coercion.
21. In Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 106 S. Ct. 2399 (1986), the harasser was a
supervisor, but neither the Court's decision nor Justice Marshall's concurrence ad-
dressed employer liability for environmental harassment by co-workers. Even if
some courts alter the standard of employer liability applied in environmental har-
assment cases based on Marshall's concurrence in Meritor, the courts that view en-
vironmental harassment as primarily sexual rather than economic coercion will
continue to be reluctant to impose liability for co-worker harassment.
[Vol. 4:245
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nomic ignores the primary criterion that defines sexual harass-
ment as women experience it: the impact it has on a woman
worker's ability to participate equally in her workplace. The thesis
of this article is that the judicial approach to sexual harassment
will continue to be unworkable until it focuses on the range of fac-
tors that actually influences harassers' ability to affect the work-
place conditions of their female counterparts.
Part II of the article discusses both the social and legal evolu-
tion of sexual harassment analysis. It traces the judicial under-
standing of sexual harassment as an abuse of power and suggests
that the courts have not yet defined or responded to sexual harass-
ment as women experience it. Even recent judicial trends, which
expand possibilities for recovery to encompass a broader range of
situations women experience, fall short of providing a workable
and accurate definition of the problem of sexual harassment.
Part III of the article analyzes plaintiffs' prima facie case of
sexual harassment. It compares and contrasts the two court-iden-
tified types of harassment and argues that the advantages offered
to plaintiffs by the new theory known as "environmental harass-
ment" 22 have already been minimized.
In part IV the article considers the judicial explanations for
two types of sexual harassment, and part V presents the implica-
tions of the two-type model. The article argues that the two-type
model is unworkable because it is based on incorrect assumptions
about sexual harassment in the workplace. The two-type model
defines sexual harassment from the perspective of the employer,
harasser, or both and fails to account for its impact on women
workers. Part VI concludes by proposing criteria that can ade-
quately respond to women workers' experience of sexual
harassment.
II. Sexual Harassment as Sex Discrimination: Historical Evolution of
a Legal Doctrine
A. Social Recognition of Sexual Harassment
The term "sexual harassment" dates back only to the mid-
1970's.23 Women workers began to discuss and share with each
other stories of sexual exploitation at work.24 As more and more
22. See definition of environmental harassment infra text accompanying notes
56, 101.
23. See Backhouse & Cohen, supra note 1, at 130-42; Goodman, supra note 1, at
443-48.
24. For descriptions of individual women's experiences, see Advocacy, supra
note 2; Farley, supra note 1, at 21-31 (scenarios range from a receptionist in a den-
1986]
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women told tales of leaving a job or being fired because of discom-
fort with a man's sexual behavior, it became clear their exper-
iences were not unique but rather a reflection of a social problem
commonly encountered by women at work.25 When women
brought sexual harassment to the public's attention, their analysis
and definition of the problem grew out of the concrete realities of
their experiences.26 In the early stage of social recognition of sex-
ual harassment,27 the focus was not on its legal implications but
rather on its sociopolitical origins and impact on working women. 28
Despite the fact that sexual harassment is a workplace prob-
lem, feminists rather than labor activists initially analyzed and de-
fined it.29 As feminists explored the roots of sexual harassment,
they recognized two distinct, but interrelated, forces in operation:
physical or sexual coercion of women by men3 0 and economic ex-
ploitation of women at the workplace.S1 They understood this co-
tist office who was raped by the dentist to a restaurant manager who told female
job applicants that sexual favors were a mandatory job requirement); case scenario,
supra text following note 20.
25. Farley, supra note 1, at 12-14.
26. Many of the feminist organizations involved in analyzing and studying sex-
ual harassment worked with and counseled victims of sexual harassment to help
resolve their problems in the workplace. As such, their knowledge of the dynamics
and issues involved came directly from women experiencing harassment. Examples
of such organizations in the United States include Alliance Against Sexual Coer-
cion (AASC), Working Women United Institute (WWUI), and Women Organized
Against Social Harassment (WOASH). The author is familiar with the work of
these organizations because of her own involvement with AASC and sexual harass-
ment work from 1979 until the present. The types of work done by these organiza-
tions is not clearly documented in particular publications. The reader can look at
pamphlets or studies done by these groups, however, to develop a general under-
standing of their work. See, i.e., Advocacy, supra note 2; Peggy Crull, The Impact
of Sexual Harassment on the Job: A Profile of the Experiences of 92 Women,
Working Women's Inst., Research Series Report No. 3 (1979), reprinted in Sexual-
ity in Organizations: Romantic and Coercive Behaviors at Work 67 (Dail Ann New-
garten & Jay M. Shafritz eds. 1980) [hereinafter Coercive Behaviors]. For further
discussion of these organizations, see Backhouse & Cohen, supra note 1, at 138-42.
27. In addition to feminist organizations recognizing sexual harassment,
Redbook magazine conducted a self-reporting survey in 1976 in which 88% of 9,000
respondents said they received unwanted sexual attention on the job. Additional
studies have confirmed the prevalence of the problem. For a partial summary of
studies documenting the incidence of sexual harassment, see Coercive Behaviors,
supra note 26, at 4-7; see also Merit Systems, supra note 10.
28. See supra note 26.
29. For a more complete discussion of labor's early reactions to the issue of sex-
ual harassment, see Advocacy, supra note 2; Farley, supra note 1, at 157-69; Alli-
ance Against Sexual Coercion, Organizing Against Sexual Harassment, Radical
Am. 17 (1981) [hereinafter AASC].
30. For complete discussion on the topic of violence against women and its rela-
tion to sexual harassment, see Backhouse & Cohen, supra note 1, at 32-45; MacKin-
non, supra note 5, at 217-21; AASC, supra note 29.
31. For example, though women constitute 53% of the United States labor
force, they are still concentrated in low-paying dead-end jobs. Among full-time,
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ercive treatment was possible because of two separate, but
connected, systems of social inequality: male dominance over wo-
men and employer control over employees. 32
In trying to analyze and understand the origins and implica-
tions of sexual harassment, feminists drew from their experiences
and knowledge about the crime of rape.3 3 They analogized sexual
harassment to rape because, like rape, the harassment stems from
an attitude that women are "fair game" for male aggression-that
it is a man's perogative to relate sexually regardless of female ac-
quiescence.34 In fact, at least one sexual harassment organiza-
tion-the Alliance Against Sexual Coercion-grew out of a rape
crisis center. Women who were raped or harassed by men at their
workplace turned to the rape crisis center for help because their
experiences at work resembled sexual abuse experienced in other
situations.35
Although feminists recognized important differences between
rape and sexual harassment, they were nonetheless influenced by
the analytic paradigms developed in the rape-crisis movement.36
Feminists stressed the importance of a subjective and flexible defi-
nition of sexual harassment and recognized that one incident of
sexual coercion was sufficient to constitute sexual harassment. 37
As with rape, consent is a key element in defining sexual harass-
ment. To constitute harassment, sexual attention must be un-
wanted. 38 The definition of sexual harassment, therefore, must
year-round workers, the average white woman earns approximately 59% of the av-
erage white man's wages. Black women earn even less than white women. For
those who are out of work, unemployment rates are higher among women than
men. U.S. Dep't of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Report 673, The Female-Male
Earnings Gap: A Review of Employment and Earnings Issues (1982); U.S. Dep't of
Labor, Women's Bureau, 20 Facts on Women Workers (1982). Feminist writers
have considered the significance of these facts. See Farley, supra note 1, at 45-51;
MacKinnon, supra note 5, at 9-18.
32. Feminists recognized that the phenomenon of harassment mirrored male/
female dynamics found outside the workplace. Further, they recognized that if wo-
men were in fact equal to men or employees equal to their supervisors, the basis
for this type of coercive behavior would be eliminated. See Advocacy, supra note 2;
MacKinnon, supra note 5, at 9-23.
33. For discussions concerning sexual harassment and rape, see Advocacy,
supra note 2; Backhouse & Cohen, supra note 1, at 42-43; AASC, supra note 29.
34. See Kate Millet, Sexual Politics 23-58 (1970).
35. Backhouse & Cohen, supra note 1, at 140-41.
36. See supra notes 33, 35.
37. See Advocacy, supra note 2; Backhouse & Cohen, supra note 1, at 32-45; in-
fra note 105.
38. In Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 106 S. Ct. 2399 (1986), the Court recognized
the need for a subjective determination of consent.
[T]he fact that sex-related conduct was "voluntary," in the sense that
the complainant was not forced to participate against her will, is not a
defense to a sexual harassment suit brought under Title VII. The gra-
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account for specific behavior that might be acceptable to some wo-
men and not to others.39 What is unwanted must be determined
subjectively according to an individual woman's situation, sexual
values, and cultural beliefs.40 Feminists also agreed that one or
two unwanted sexual acts were enough under an accurate defini-
tion of sexual harassment. The behavior need not be repeated to
qualify as sexual harassment.4 1
As feminists learned more about the effects of sexual harass-
ment and developed strategies to counter it, they realized that the
analogy to rape was incomplete.42 Women subjected to sexual har-
assment do report many of the same feelings and responses as rape
victims, 43 but their experience is fundamentally altered because
harassment occurs in the context of workplace relations. Sexual
harassment threatens a woman's economic security44 and thus
raises questions about her ability to survive and support herself as
an economically independent human being.45 To challenge and ul-
vamen of any sexual harassment claim is that the alleged sexual ad-
vances were "unwelcome."
Id. at 2406. The Court held that "the correct inquiry is whether plaintiff, by her
conduct, indicated that the alleged sexual advances were unwelcome, not whether
her actual participation ... was voluntary." Id. Thus, the Court recognized, as did
feminists years earlier, that the issue is whether a woman worker willingly
consents.
39. This concern was also shared by the policymakers who drafted the EEOC
guidelines on sexual harassment. For discussions concerning the subjective compo-
nent of a definition of sexual harassment, see generally Jan Leventer, Sexual Har-
assment and Title VII: EEOC Guidelines, Conditions, Litigation, and the United
States Supreme Court, 10 Cap. U.L. Rev. 481, 482-83 (1981); T. Clay Smith Jr., Pro-
logue to the EEOC Guidelines on Sexual Harassment, 10 Cap. U.L. Rev. 472, 473-74
(1982).
40. See, e.g., AASC, supra note 29.
41. Compare the following two definitions as to the requirement that the har-
assment be repeated: "Any interference with an individual's work performance be-
cause of sex discrimination should not be tolerated under title VII, regardless of its
substantiality... ," Comments on the EEOC Interim Guidelines on Sexual Harass-
ment submitted by National Organization for Women, National Women's Political
Caucus, New York City Commission on the Status of Women, Center for National
Policy Review, Women Employed, Women's Equity Action League Educational and
Legal Defense Fund, NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., Women's
Legal Defense Fund [hereinafter Comments], June 10, 1980, or "sexual harassment
is deliberate or repeated unsolicited verbal comments, gestures, or physical contact
of a sexual nature which are unwelcome." U.S. Office of Personnel Management,
Memorandum to Heads of Departments and Independent Agencies, Subject: Pol-
icy Statement and Definition of Sexual Harassment (Dec. 12, 1979).
42. Advocacy, supra note 2; Backhouse & Cohen, supra note 1, at 42-43; AASC,
supra note 29.
43. For a discussion of women's emotional responses to sexual harassment, see
Backhouse & Cohen, supra note 1, at 38-39.
44. Evidence of the direct impact sexual harassment can have on the lives of
working women can be found in the results of the U.S. Merit System's Protection
Board report. See Merit Systems, supra note 10, at 63-74.
45. In this way, sexual harassment parallels the experience of many women
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timately defeat sexual harassment, women must confront the hier-
archical organization of work itself.46  Feminists came to
understand that "[w]ork is the key element in understanding sex-
ual harassment, because this is the prize men are controlling
through their extortion."47
When sexual harassment finally was recognized as a form of
sex discrimination, feminists were enthusiastic but skeptical.48
Although the opportunity for women to seek compensation
through the legal system was long overdue and welcomed,49 some
feminists believed the legal system could not respond to or remedy
the systematic origins of sexual harassment.50 Catharine MacKin-
non commented on the problems embodied in the legal recognition
of sexual harassment as early as 1979:
[W]hen a form of suffering is made a legal wrong, especially
when its victims lack power, its social dynamics are not di-
rectly embodied or reflected in the law. Legal prohibitions
may arise because of the anguish people feel or conditions they
find insupportable, but the legal issues may not turn on the so-
cial issues that are the reasons they exist.5 '
Indeed, the gap which frequently exists between the legal under-
standing of a problem and its social reality is reflected in the de-
velopment of sexual harassment theories of recovery.52 Courts
began to compensate some women for the unfair treatment they
endured, but courts drew lines which caused other behavior recog-
nized as sexual harassment by feminists to fall outside the legal
who are abused by their husbands. For discussion on the role of economic depen-
dence and battered women, see generally Roger Langley & Richard Clevy, Wife
Beating: The Silent Crisis (1977); Del Martin, Battered Wives (1976); Erin Pizzey,
Scream Quietly or the Neighbors Will Hear (1977).
46. Many authors have argued, as does this one, that sexual harassment as we
know it is largely a function of a capitalist system of economic organization. The
inherent inequities of a competitive wage-labor system result in job segregation,
with women concentrated in low-paying, dead-end jobs, lacking power and indepen-
dence to control the terms and conditions of their work. See generally Farley,
supra note 1, at 28-44. For a more complete discussion of the organization of work
in modern America, see Harry Braverman, Labor and Monopoly Capital (1974).
47. Farley, supra note 1, at 29.
48. See, e.g., Alliance Against Sexual Coercion, Fighting Sexual Harassment:
An Update (1981); Comments, supra note 41.
49. Comments, supra note 41.
50. For a more complete discussion of this idea, see MacKinnon, supra note 5,
at 57-99.
51. Id. at 41.
52. This schism is also present in other areas of the law which attempt to ad-
dress social problems women face. See, e.g., Phyllis Crocker, The Meaning of Equal-
ity for Battered Women Who Kill Men in Self-Defense, 8 Harv. Women's L.J. 121
(1985) (judicial understanding of the experiences of battered women does not re-
flect the social realities).
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definition. This tension continues to permeate even the most re-
cent developments in sexual harassment case law.
B. Legal Recognition of Sexual Harassment
The law recognizes two types of sexual harassment: quid pro
quo and environmental sexual harassment.53 Early cases recog-
nized only quid pro quo harassment, defining it as unwanted re-
quests or demands for sex which result in tangible economic loss
to a worker who did not comply.54 The economic harm could be
either a benefit the worker deserved and was denied when she re-
fused the harassment, or a detriment imposed solely because she
did not comply with sexual demands. 55 More recently, courts be-
gan to accept a theory of environmental harassment defined as un-
wanted verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature which creates
a hostile or offensive working environment.5 6 In contrast to quid
pro quo harassment, environmental theory requires no tangible
53. These two types are defined and discussed most clearly in Henson v. City of
Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 901 (11th Cir. 1982).
54. Miller v. Bank of Am., 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979); Tomkins v. Public Serv.
Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977); Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C.
Cir. 1977); Williams v. Civiletti, 487 F. Supp. 1387 (D.D.C. 1980); Heelan v. Johns-
Manville Corp., 451 F. Supp. 1382 (D. Colo. 1978); Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp.
654 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240
(D.C. Cir. 1978).
55. The critical factor is that the harm be tangible and quantifiable. Most fre-
quently that means plaintiff lost her job. E.g., Craig v. Y & Y Snacks, Inc., 721 F.2d
77 (3d Cir. 1983); Phillips v. Smalley Maintenance Servs., Inc., 711 F.2d 1524 (11th
Cir. 1983); Miller v. Bank of Am., 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979); Tomkins v. Public
Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977); Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983
(D.C. Cir. 1977); Hall v. F.O. Thacker Co., 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1499
(N.D. Ga. 1980); Heelan v. Johns-Manville Corp., 451 F. Supp. 1382 (D. Colo. 1978);
cf. Toscano v. Nimmo, 570 F. Supp. 1197 (D. Del. 1983) (promotion granted to an-
other female employee because she slept with the boss); Cummings v. Walsh Const.
Co., 561 F. Supp. 872 (S.D. Ga. 1983) (plaintiff required to do harsh tasks for refus-
ing advances).
56. Environmental sexual harassment was first recognized in Bundy v. Jackson,
641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981). It has since been recognized in other circuits. See
Downes v. Federal Aviation Administration, 775 F.2d 288 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Horn v.
Duke Homes, 755 F.2d 599, 606 n.9 (7th Cir. 1985) (facts alleged indicate quid pro
quo harassment, however analysis implicitly recognizes environmental harass-
ment). Simmons v. Lyons, 746 F.2d 265 (5th Cir. 1984) (overruling district court dis-
missal of plaintiff's case for failure to state a cause of action); Barrett v. Omaha
Nat'l Bank, 726 F.2d 424 (8th Cir. 1984); Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1983);
Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982). The Supreme Court has
also recognized the environmental theory in Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 106 S. Ct.
2399 (1986).
The EEOC regulations also recognize environmental sexual harassment. These
guidelines provide that sexual harassment violates title VII when it "has the pur-
pose or effect of unreasonably interfering.., or creating an intimidating, hostile, or




Courts purport to distinguish between quid pro quo and envi-
ronmental harassment on the basis of the harm a woman worker
experiences-psychological (environmental) or economic (quid pro
quo) harm. The distinctions courts impose are actually more far-
reaching. Courts identify quid pro quo harassment with economic
harm to the victim and with an abuse of economic power by the
harasser. Courts define environmental harassment as behavior
that harms a worker psychologically and results from sexual or
gender-based coercion, which courts believe does not originate in
the workplace itself. The distinctions between the two types of
harassment have guided the courts' analysis of the problem and
have resulted in different standards of employer liability for quid
pro quo and environmental harassment.58 As a result, plaintiffs
have great difficulty in establishing employer liability, particularly
in environmental harassment cases.59
Judicial decisions reflect a fundamental incapacity to con-
ceive of and accept what women workers knew from the begin-
ning: sexual harassment is an expression of both male sexual
power and economic power. The two cannot be separated. As a
result, even recent changes in the doctrine that brought hope of a
breakthrough in legal consciousness have been quickly undercut.60
The courts' inability to grasp the dual nature of the problem
of sexual harassment was explicitly revealed in the first cases
brought in the mid-1970's.61 Not only were the courts blind to the
existence of and connections between the two types of power ex-
erted over women workers through sexual harassment, they were
also incapable of understanding sexual harassment as an expres-
sion of power at all. Courts viewed the harassment as sexual be-
havior which happened to occur at work.62 Although recognizing a
57. Although the definitions used by the courts theoretically require no show-
ing of tangible loss, i.e., economic harm, patterns of recovery indicate otherwise.
See infra notes 163-168 and accompanying text.
58. See supra notes 200-206 and accompanying text for a discussion of the im-
pact the Supreme Court's recent decision in Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 106 S. Ct.
2399 (1986) might have on standards of employer liability for the two types of
harassment.
59. See generally infra part III(D), (E).
60. See generally infra part III.
61. Recovery was denied despite factual proof of sexual advances and retalia-
tion following plaintiff's refusal to comply in Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas
Co., 422 F. Supp. 553 (D.N.J. 1976), rev'd, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977); Miller v.
Bank of Am., 418 F. Supp. 233 (N.D. Ca. 1976), rev'd, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979);
Corne v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975), vacated, 562 F.2d 55
(9th Cir. 1977).
62. Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553 (D.N.J. 1976)
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woman may not desire or seek out the sexual attention, courts ac-
cepted that lack of mutuality as part and parcel of male/female re-
lations.63 In keeping with the traditional cultural model of
heterosexual relationships,64 courts assumed sexual harassment
stemmed from male sexual desire gone awry, not male dominance
over women, expressed sexually. In Barnes v. Costle ,65 a 1977 deci-
sion, the court concluded: "We are not here concerned with racial
epithets or confusing union authorization cards, which serve no
one's interest, but with social patterns that to some extent are nor-
mal and expectable. It is the abuse of the practice, rather than the
practice itself, that arouses alarm."6 6 A year earlier, another court
described the harassment as "physical attack motivated by sexual
desire . . . which happened to occur in a corporate corridor rather
than a back alley." 67 One court refused to recognize sexual harass-
ment as an illegal practice because "[tihe only sure way an em-
ployer could avoid such charges would be to have employees who
were asexual." 68 Such comments illustrate an incapacity to distin-
guish between heterosexual relationships based on mutual attrac-
tion and desire, and male/female power dynamics expressed
through the medium of sexual control.
Beginning in the late 1970's, courts began to grapple with this
distinction and to identify coercive economic behaviors that
tainted even these "normal and expectable" patterns. Courts fi-
nally determined sexual harassment was sex discrimination in em-
ployment when it was clear a harasser relied on his workplace
authority to extort sexual favors.69 They began to define sexual
rev'd, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977); Corne v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161
(D. Ariz. 1975), vacated, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977).
63. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec.
& Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553 (D.N.J. 1976), rev'd , 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977); Come
v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975), vacated, 562 F.2d 55 (9th
Cir. 1977).
64. For a discussion of traditional male/female sexual dynamics, see generally
Eleanor Maccoby, The Development of Sex Differences (1976); Margaret Mead,
Male and Female: A Study of the Sexes in a Changing World (1949); Millet, supra
note 34; Lionel Tiger, Male Dominance? Yes. A Sexist Plot? No., N.Y. Times, Oct.
25, 1970, (Magazine) at 35.
65. 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
66. Id. at 1001 (MacKinnon, J., concurring).
67. Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553, 556 (D.N.J. 1976),
rev'd, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977).
68. Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163-64 (D. Ariz. 1975), va-
cated, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977).
69. E.g., Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977);
Williams v. Civiletti, 487 F. Supp. 1387 (D.D.C. 1980); Heelan v. Johns-Manville
Corp., 451 F. Supp. 1382 (D. Colo. 1978). For cases where this connection was sup-
posedly absent, see Hill v. BASF Wyandotte Corp., 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
67 (E.D. Mich. 1981); Clark v. World Airways, 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 305
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harassment as primarily an abuse of economic power. This meant
a sexual harassment plaintiff had to show that an economic benefit
was conditioned on her compliance with the harasser's sexual de-
mands.70 Courts named this harassment "quid pro quo sexual
harassment." Implicit in this definition was the requirement that
the harasser occupy a position of power in the workplace hierarchy
sufficient to threaten his victim's status at work. He must be a su-
pervisor or manager and not the plaintiff's co-worker. 71 The as-
sumption underlying this approach to sexual harassment is
ultimately the same as the sexual desire model applied in the ear-
lier cases: male sexual expression and aggression in the workplace
is acceptable, or at least lawful. It exceeds the bounds of legiti-
mate behavior only if accompanied by economic dominance or
coercion.
Even though courts recognized the economic coercion in-
volved, they were reluctant to impose liability on employers for
sexual harassment. This reluctance stemmed from an inability to
understand the employer's role in either causing or allowing the
discrimination. Courts viewed sexual harassment as one man's
sexual ploys, rather than a condition of work employers must ac-
count for in exercising their management responsibilities. 72 In ad-
dition, courts could not identify an economic motive underlying
the discrimination. Unlike other discriminatory policies aimed at
women, such as unequal pay,73 sexual harassment does not benefit
employers by saving them significant amounts of money.74 In fact,
(D.D.C. 1980); Hall v. F.O. Thacker Co., 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1499 (N.D.
Ga. 1980).
70. To show that quid pro quo harassment affects a term or condition of em-
ployment, a plaintiff must satisfy a two part test: 1) plaintiff was otherwise entitled
to the benefit she did not receive (or not entitled to the detriment); and 2) plain-
tiff's reaction to the sexual harassment caused the resulting job loss. See Phillips v.
Smalley Maintenance Servs., Inc., 711 F.2d 1524 (11th Cir. 1983); Henson v. City of
Dundee, 682 F.2d 847 (11th Cir. 1982).
71. In defining quid pro quo harassment, the courts do not explicitly state that
only supervisors possess workplace authority sufficient to extort sexual favors, but
the analysis clearly leads to such a conclusion. See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682
F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982) (workplace authority not necessary for environmental har-
assment as no economic harm is required); Smith v. Rust Eng'g Co., 18 Empl. Prac.
Dec. (CCH) 8698 (N.D. Ala. 1978) (co-worker could not use economic coercion to
extort sexual favors).
72. See, e.g., Ludington v. Sambo's Restaurants, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 480, 483 (E.D.
Wisc. 1979) (recovery denied because "[t]itle VII is directed at acts of employment
discrimination rather than individual acts of discrimination" as in this instance);
Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975), vacated, 562
F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977) ("In the present case, Mr. Price's [the harasser's] conduct
appears to be nothing more than a personal proclivity, pecularity or mannerism.").
73. See supra note 31; cf. Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1982).
74. While employers save vast sums of money by paying female employees
wages roughly equal to 59% of their male counterparts, supra note 31, sexual bar-
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sexual harassment is expensive. It lowers the productivity of all
workers75 and causes higher absenteeism and turnover among wo-
men workers.76
For these reasons, courts have applied less stringent em-
ployer liability standards in sexual harassment cases than those
imposed in other employment discrimination contexts. 77 Employ-
ers are frequently not liable for failing to prevent sexual harass-
ment. Courts used a less strict standard even though sexual
harassment has the same effect on women workers as any other
discriminatory behavior: it is a barrier to equal opportunity at
work that women must cross only because of their sex.
As quid pro quo sexual harassment theory developed, it be-
came increasingly clear that the narrow definition of sexual har-
assment limited recovery as much as the less stringent standards
for employer liability. Workers came to the courts protesting
harassing treatment, even though they had not suffered a direct
economic injury.78 Women argued that sexually harassing behav-
ior was itself a violation of title VII, whether the harassment re-
sulted in tangible economic losses or not. Courts began to
recognize that the legal model did not account for many of the fac-
tual scenarios women sought to challenge.
In the mid-1970's, courts assumed sexually harassing behavior
absent concomitant economic coercion was legally tolerable, even
though socially undesirable, because it was an acceptable social
pattern-a mirror of society's sanction of male/female relations79
Later in that decade, an active feminist movement stimulated
assment is very expensive. The cost of sexual harassment to the federal govern-
ment alone over a two-year period was conservatively estimated at $189 million.
See Merit Systems, supra note 10, at 76.
75. Dollar cost of diminished productivity of sexual harassment victims in the
federal government for a two-year period was estimated at $72.1 million. Emotional
and physical stress was estimated at $5 million. See Merit Systems, supra note 10,
at 77-78.
76. Absenteeism in the federal survey is estimated to cost $7.9 million and job
turnover $26.8 million. See Merit Systems, supra note 10, at 76-77.
77. Courts have unevenly applied three different standards for employer liabil-
ity in sexual harassment cases. For a more complete discussion, see infra notes
187-192 and accompanying text. For a discussion of employer liability in other em-
ployment discrimination contexts, see Joseph Allegretti, Sexual Harassment of Fe-
male Employees by Nonsupervisory Co-workers: A Theory of Liability, 15
Creighton L. Rev. 437 (1982); Joan Vermeulen, Employer Liability Under Title VII
for Sexual Harassment by Supervisory Employees, 10 Cap. U.L. Rev. 499 (1981).
78. See Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Morgan v. Hertz Corp.,
542 F. Supp. 123 (W.D. Tenn. 1981), aff'd 725 F.2d 1070 (6th Cir. 1984); Walter v.
KFGO Radio, 518 F. Supp. 1309 (D.N.D. 1981); Ludington v. Sambo's Restaurants,
Inc., 474 F. Supp. 480 (E.D. Wis. 1979); Smith v. Rust Eng'g Co., 18 Empl. Prac. Dec.
(CCH) 8698 (N.D. Ala. 1978).
79. See supra text accompanying notes 61-68.
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identifiable changes in social awareness of the relationships be-
tween male dominance, power, violence, and sex.80 This change
was most apparent in the growing understanding of rape as a vio-
lent crime, rather than a passionate one.81 As social understand-
ing of acceptable heterosexual dynamics began to change, so did
the corresponding legal analysis. Courts began to think critically
about male/female relations-to think about what should be,
rather than what was or had always been true. This movement in
legal consciousness cannot be seen through explicit discussions
within judicial opinions. Rather, it can be inferred from the with-
ering away of comments characterizing sexual harassment as the
inevitable result of relations between any sexual adults.8 2
Changes in judicial interpretation of certain aspects of title
VII also altered the approach to sexual harassment. The first im-
portant change occurred in the early 1970's as courts redefined the
"terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" protected under
title VII.83 In Rogers v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion,84 the Fifth Circuit recognized the claim of a Hispanic em-
ployee that her employer's discriminatory attitudes toward
Hispanic clients created an offensive work environment for the
firm's Hispanic employees. Although the plaintiff alleged no tangi-
ble economic losses, the court recognized that "today employment
discrimination is a far more complex and pervasive phenomenon,
as the nuances and subtleties of discriminatory employment prac-
tices are no longer confined to bread and butter issues."85 The
court concluded that "terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment" is "an expansive concept which sweeps within its protective
ambit the practice of creating a working environment heavily
charged with ethnic or racial discrimination."8 6 The Rogers analy-
sis recognized that title VII's reach protects workers from psycho-
80. This change became most apparent in the redefinition of three important
issues facing women: rape, wife battering, and incest. The public has increasingly
recognized the existence of these problems and has begun to alter societal assump-
tions about what provokes and perpetuates these types of violence against women.
See generally Boston Women's Health Book Collective, The New Our Bodies, Our-
selves 99-117 (1984).
81. See generally Susan Brownmiller, Against Our Will: Men, Women and
Rape (1975); Lorenne M. Clark & Debra Lewis, Rape: The Price of Coercive Sexu-
ality (1977); Diana Russell, The Politics of Rape (1975).
82. For examples of comments characterizing sexual harassment as normal and
expectable behavior, see supra text accompanying notes 66-68.
83. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982). See, e.g., Rogers v. Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Comm'n, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972).
84. 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971).
85. Id. at 238.
86. Id.; accord Carroll v. Talman Fed. Say. & Loan Assoc., 604 F.2d 1028, 1032-
33 & n.13 (7th Cir. 1979), cert denied, 445 U.S. 929 (1980).
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logically unfair treatment even if measurable economic conditions
remain untouched.
In 1980, the EEOC issued guidelines which interpret and de-
fine sexual harassment as a title VII violation,8 7 advise employers
of their legal responsibilities to prevent sexual harassment,88 and
help courts to develop legal theories of recovery.8 9 Section A of
the guidelines states that sexual harassment is a violation of title
VII and defines it as:
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and
other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature . . .when
(1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or im-
plicitly a term or condition of an individual's employment, (2)
submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is
used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such indi-
vidual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of unrea-
sonably interfering with an individual's work performance or
creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working
environment. 90
The definition incorporated the Rogers principle of protecting the
psychological terms and conditions of employment by making con-
duct creating a hostile or offensive work environment illegal.9 1
The guidelines also established standards of employer liabil-
ity for sexual harassment based on the harasser's position in the
workplace hierarchy. Section C provides that the employer92 is re-
sponsible for harassment by its agents and supervisory employees
"regardless of whether the specific acts complained of were au-
thorized or even forbidden by the employer and regardless of
whether the employer knew or should have known of their occur-
rence."
9 3 Liability for harassment by co-workers, defined in sec-
87. The EEOC first published its interim guidelines on sexual harassment in
the Federal Register at 45 Fed. Reg. 25,024 on April 11, 1980. After a 60-day public
comment period, the final guidelines were published on November 10, 1980 at 45
Fed. Reg. 74,676. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
88. The EEOC decided to issue the guidelines in part to give employers notice
of and assistance in understanding their liability for sexual harassment. See Clay,
supra note 39, at 472.
89. See supra note 9.
90. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1985).
91. Both the EEOC guidelines and Rogers require plaintiffs to show a pervasive
atmosphere of discriminatory harassment and not a "mere utterance" of discrimi-
natory remarks. Rogers v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 454 F.2d 234,
238 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972).
92. Section C specifies the meaning of the term "employer." It includes: em-
ployer, employment agency, joint apprenticeship committee, and labor organization.
93. 29 C.F.R. Section 1604.11(c) (1985) states in full:
Applying general title VII principles, an employer, employment
agency, joint apprenticeship committee or labor organization (herein-
after collectively referred to as "employer") is responsible for its acts
and those of its agents and supervisory employees with respect to sex-
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tion D, follows only where the employer 94 "knows or should have
known of the conduct and fails to take immediate and appropriate
corrective action." 95
The legal and social developments of the 1970's finally forced
courts to recognize that the impact of sexual harassment on wo-
men workers went beyond the losses they suffered as a direct re-
sult of economic coercion.96 Courts recognized sexual coercion was
itself a problem, separate and distinct from the interwoven eco-
nomic abuse. Given this new understanding, courts began to rule
that the law should provide recourse to a woman who is subjected
to harassing behavior, regardless of whether she is also disciplined
economically. Otherwise, "an employer could sexually harass a fe-
male employee with impunity by carefully stopping short of firing
the employee or taking any other tangible actions against her in
response to her resistance." 9 7 Through this progression of the law,
courts accepted the claim that sexual coercion without economic
harm violated title VII and adopted a new legal theory, environ-
mental sexual harassment, to address the experiences of women
whose most obvious injury was psychological rather than
economic.
The remainder of this article examines these two theories of
sexual harassment and concludes that courts have refined and ap-
plied environmental sexual harassment theory in ways that mini-
ual harassment regardless of whether the specific acts complained of
were authorized or even forbidden by the employer and regardless of
whether the employer knew or should have known of their occur-
rence. The Commission will examine the circumstances of the particu-
lar employment relationship and the job functions performed by the
individual in determining whether an individual acts in either a super-
visory or agency capacity.
94. In this context, the term "employer" includes the employer, its agents, and
supervisory employees. Section D states in full: "With respect to conduct between
fellow employees, an employer is responsible for acts of sexual harassment in the
workplace where the employer (or its agents or supervisory employees) knows or
should have known of the conduct, unless it can show that it took immediate and
appropriate corrective action." 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d) (1985).
95. Section E of the guidelines applies the same measure for employer liability
to harassment by non-employees. The full text reads:
An employer may also be responsible for the acts of non-employees,
with respect to sexual harassment of employees in the workplace,
where the employer (or its agents or supervisory employees) knows or
should have known of the conduct and fails to take immediate and ap-
propriate corrective action. In reviewing these cases the Commission
will consider the extent of the employer's control and any other legal
responsibility which the employer may have with respect to the con-
duct of such non-employees.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(e) (1985).
96. Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981) stated this implicitly, but
other courts reached similar conclusions. See cases cited infra notes 149-168.
97. Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 945 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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mize the differences between it and quid pro quo theory. To the
extent courts acknowledge a scenario of environmental harass-
ment distinct from a quid pro quo situation, they are reluctant to
hold employers liable for the abusive or offensive environment.
The initial judicial perceptions of sexual harassment, which failed
to accurately reflect discrimination as women experience it, con-
tinue to stymie the development and application of this latest addi-
tion to the evolving legal doctrine of sexual harassment as a title
VII violation.
III. Prima Facie Case of Sexual Harassment: Comparison of Quid
Pro Quo and Environmental Harassment Theories
The elements of a plaintiff's prima facie case for quid pro quo
and environmental harassment are identical in name but not in
the underlying proof a plaintiff must produce to present her claim.
Quid pro quo harassment occurs when an economic benefit9 8 a
worker rightfully deserves is conditioned on her compliance with
the harasser's sexual demands.99 The typical situation involves a
male supervisor who demands sex from a female subordinate and
retaliates when she refuses, either by withholding a promotion or
raise or firing her for a pretextual reason. In contrast, environ-
mental sexual harassment takes place when a worker's psychologi-
cal well-beinglOo is threatened by the offensive environment
surrounding her. Environmental sexual harassment theory allows
recovery for sexual harassment when the plaintiff establishes the
sexual harassment was "sufficiently pervasive so as to alter the
conditions of employment and create an abusive working environ-
ment."'101 In theory, the worker need not suffer measurable eco-
nomic loss. This type of harassment supposes a woman worker
amidst a group of male co-workers (or supervisors) who make re-
peated obscene sexual comments and innuendos.
Despite these differences, plaintiffs must establish the same
98. Note that quid pro quo harassment also includes the scenario wherein a
worker is punished or otherwise negatively impacted because she refuses to comply
with sexual demands.
99. As noted before, the court's implicit assumption regarding quid pro quo har-
assment is that the harasser must control the economic fate of his victims to extort
sexual favors. In other words, he must be above her in the workplace hierarchy.
This assumption is incorrect. Even male co-workers often have power sufficient to
force compliance. See supra note 19 and text following note 20. The power of male
co-workers is frequently the result of the economic vulnerability of most working
women. See in fra note 174.
100. The legal theory defines the harm suffered in an environmental harassment
scenario as psychological harm only; in reality, a worker's psychological and eco-
nomic well-being are inextricable.
101. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3) (1985).
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elements to complete a prima facie case: 1) she is a member of a
protected group; 2) she experienced unwanted sexual harassment;
3) the harassment was based on sex; 4) the harassment was a term
or condition of her employment; and 5) the employer knew or
should have known of the harassment and failed to take action.1 02
The following discussion analyzes the elements103 of the prima fa-
cie case, focusing on the differences and similarities between the
two theories of harassment. The analysis will show courts mini-
mize the differences between the two theories with respect to the
plaintiff's burden of proving she suffered unwanted harassment as
a condition of her employment, but maximize the differences with
respect to employer liability. To understand environmental har-
assment as discrimination in violation of title VII, courts define
and explain it in quid pro quo terms. Yet, the differences are
strong enough that courts are unwilling to impose liability equally
for both types of harassment. The result for women workers is to
erode expectations for additional routes to recovery promised by
the environmental theory.
A. Unwelcome Sexual Harassment
This element requires plaintiffs to identify harassing behav-
ior and prove the acts' 0 4 were unwanted. The determination var-
ies according to the context. A given behavior might be harassing
in one situation and perfectly acceptable in another-depending on
the reaction of a particular woman.105 Consequently, most courts
102. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982).
103. This discussion is limited to elements two through five. Element one simply
requires the plaintiff to be either a man or woman, as sex is a protected group
under title VII. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1982).
104. The acts themselves are frequently identical in environmental and quid pro
quo harassment given that the critical distinction between the two is what happens
to an employee after she experiences sexual harassment, not the treatment itself.
Compare Phillips v. Smalley Maintenance Servs., Inc., 711 F.2d 1524 (11th Cir.
1983) (quid pro quo claim based on offensive comments, remarks and questions
with occasional requests for sex) and Coley v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 561 F. Supp.
645 (E.D. Mich. 1982) (environmental claim based on vulgar comments about sex)
with Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson 106 S. Ct. 2399 (1986) (environmental claim
based on forced sexual intercourse 40-50 times during work hours; claim defeated
on other grounds).
105. The dilemma in precisely circumscribing acts which constitute sexual har-
assment is twofold. First, the same acts of verbal comments, requests for dates,
etc., may or may not be acceptable depending on the circumstances. Second, the
same acts may be acceptable to one woman and harassing or coercive to another.
The latter, which involves the woman's subjective response, is at issue as courts de-
termine whether the sexual harassment was unwelcome. Well-established princi-
ples of tort law indicate liability generally extends to include the particularities of
victims, most notably the "eggshell skull" theory. See William Prosser, Law of
Torts 43 (4th ed. 1979).
1986]
Law and Inequality
focus less on the acts of the harasser and more on the plaintiff's
response: was the sexual attention the plaintiff received un-
wanted? The Supreme Court's recent decision in Meritor Savings
Bank v. Vinson 106 confirms the importance of the plaintiff strenu-
ously voicing her objections to the sexual attention. In Meritor,
the Court distinguished between voluntary participation in sexual
conduct and welcome participation in that conduct. The Court in-
dicated that the proper focus is not whether the plaintiff volunta-
rily complied with the harasser's sexual demands (that is,
submitted to the demands without physical resistance or without
being forced to comply) but whether the plaintiff willingly or un-
happily complied.107 Thus, the Court concluded, "The gravamen
of any sexual harassment claim is that the alleged sexual advances
were unwelcome."10s
As a result, it is critical for any sexual harassment case that
the plaintiff have publically expressed discomfort or disapproval
when confronted with the harassment. Although the legal inquiry
concerning the unwelcome nature of the harassment is the same
for both quid pro quo and environmental harassment, the practical
reality for a plaintiff who must publically indicate her disapproval
varies greatly depending on the type of harassment.
1. Quid pro quo sexual harassment.
Quid pro quo sexual harassment occurs, by definition, when a
supervisor retaliates against an employee for rebuffing his sexual
demands. Thus, the discomfort or disapproval an employee feels
must be known by the harasser. The difficult situation, legally,
arises when the initial sexual relationship was mutual, and the
employee's subsequent decision to terminate it catalyzes the
retaliatory behavior.1o 9 In general, a woman's free and voluntary
consent to a sexual relationship will bar a subsequent sexual har-
assment claim because the employee was not offended or
intimidated by the supervisor's behavior until the relationship be-
gan to deteriorate. Courts contend that in these situations she
106. 106 S. Ct. 2399 (1986).
107. The Court's distinction in Meritor between "voluntary" participation and
"unwelcome" participation is erroneous. Anytime a woman finds sexual advances
unwelcome, but nevertheless submits to the sexual conduct, she is "involuntarily"
engaging in the conduct.
108. 106 S. Ct. at 2406.
109. In such instances, courts frequently find the female employee has "assumed
the risk" involved in relating sexually to her male supervisors and bar recovery.
Although the term "assumption of risk" is not utilized, the underpinnings of the
analysis closely follow that defense to a negligence action. See generally Prosser,
supra note 105, at 68.
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welcomed the allegedly harassing conduct.110 Once the relation-
ship ends, courts characterize the fall out as either a personality
conflict or "sour grapes"-as a personal consequence of intimate
choices rather than a work-related event. Some courts, however,
have awarded damages when plaintiffs' initial consent was not free
and voluntary. In one case in which a prior relationship evolved
into harassing treatment, the court highlighted that the employee
initially began the relationship because the harasser's supervisor
indicated "her success [at work] or anywhere else depended on
him.'111
The courts' insistence that every instance of sexual contact
between the plaintiff and her harasser be coercive illustrates an
inability to distinguish between acceptable sexual behavior and
sexual harassment. Women who challenge sexual coercion at
work are not objecting to all sexual attention at the workplace;
rather, the objection is aimed specifically at instances of forced
sexual interaction.112 Women who choose to have sexual relation-
ships with their workplace superiors do not consent to harassing
behavior. They assume an equal right to determine the future
course of that relationship, free from economic threats. The
courts' approach to this scenario of quid pro quo harassment un-
fairly penalizes certain workers simply because of their interest in
men who later turn against them.
2. Environmental sexual harassment.
In environmental sexual harassment cases, courts ask, as they
do in quid pro quo cases, whether the sexual attention was un-
wanted. Courts focus on the plaintiff's participation in creating
the hostile and abusive environment and look for a public pro-
nouncement that the plaintiff finds the workplace atmosphere of-
fensive.1 3 In two recent cases, courts denied recovery specifically
because the plaintiff employees chimed in and contributed to shop
110. See, e.g., Evans v. Mail Handlers, 32 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 634
(D.D.C. 1983) (recovery denied primarily because plaintiff had a mutually consen-
sual relationship with her supervisor for almost three years before problems arose).
111. Koster v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 554 F. Supp. 285, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); see
also Cummings v. Walsh Constr. Co., 561 F. Supp. 872 (S.D. Ga. 1983) (plaintiff had
sex with her foreman two times, but the court found it was not voluntary).
112. Some have argued for a policy against all sexual interaction at work given
the numerous difficulties some feel exist in distinguishing mutual from coercive
sexual relations. See, e.g., Margaret Mead, A Proposal: We Need Taboos on Sex at
Work, in Coercive Behaviors, supra note 26, at 53.
113. In Meritor, the Supreme Court went further and sanctioned trial courts to
consider the plaintiff's dress and speech in deciding whether plaintiff welcomed the




floor banter with vulgar language and sexual comments.114 In
each of those cases, the court noted it could not discern from the
plaintiff's behavior that the environment was hostile or
offensive.11 5
Again, courts place a burden on sexual harassment plaintiffs
to abstain from all sexual activity at work in order to compensate
for the courts' own inability to define and delineate the types of
sexual interactions that occur."i 6 This burden is especially onerous
in an environmental sexual harassment situation because a certain
level of workplace banter is commonplace, enjoyable, and ex-
pected. Particularly for women who work in nontraditional con-
struction or industrial settings, some participation in potentially
offensive workplace rituals is a prerequisite to acceptance as a seri-
ous co-worker.117 Women in these workplaces must join in social
interactions with their co-workers to build the trust and com-
radery they need to work safely"i8 at the job site.
In quid pro quo and environmental sexual harassment cases,
the underlying message is the same: women deserve protection
from coercive sexual/economic treatment only when their "hands
are clean."ii9 Because courts cannot draw lines to separate illegal
sexual coercion and undesirable social behavior, they impose stan-
dards of behavior on women workers which force women to act
differently than their male co-workers. To protect and preserve
later claims of sexual harassment, women must act like outsiders
in much workplace activity, perpetuating and reinforcing the no-
tion they are women first and workers second.
Courts should not draw the line between acceptable and ille-
114. Ukarish v. Magnesium Elektron, 31 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1315,
(D.N.J. 1983); Gan v. Kepro Circuit Systems, Inc., 27 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH)
32,379, 32,380 (E.D. Mo. 1982) (plaintiff "actively contributed to the distasteful
working environment by her own profane and sexually suggestive conduct").
115. Ukarish v. Magnesium Elektron, 31 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1317
(D.N.J. 1983) (found that plaintiff accepted and participated in atmosphere at work
despite diary entries documenting her concern and discomfort); see also Reichman
v. Bureau of Affirmative Action, 536 F. Supp. 1149 (D. Pa. 1982) (plaintiff's discom-
fort not obvious because of her flirtatious personality).
116. It has been recognized that "the question of whether particular conduct was
indeed unwelcome presents difficult problems of proof and turns largely on credi-
bility determinations committed to the trier of fact." Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson,
106 S. Ct. 2399, 2406 (1986). Unfortunately, trial courts have not willingly engaged
in this difficult fact-finding task.
117. See, e.g., Backhouse & Cohan, supra note 1, at 11-14 (construction worker
case study); Ukarish v. Magnesium Elektron, 31 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1315,
1319 (D.N.J. 1983) (plaintiff as only woman on production floor participated in the
"customary plant language that pervaded the atmosphere").
118. Construction work, for example, requires team work to perform tasks
safely. See Goodman, supra note 1, at 454-55 & nn.65-66.
119. 27 Am. Jur. 2d Equity §§ 136-44 (1966).
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gal sexual activity by requiring women to act like puritans. 120 In-
stead, courts must attempt to identify the point where sexual
coercion becomes discriminatory-when it begins to create a bar-
rier to women workers' equal participation in the workplace.121 In
that way, courts can eliminate barriers to equality rather than im-
pose additional ones.
B. Harassment Based on Sex
The plaintiff must next convince the court she experienced
sexual harassment because she is a woman. In other words, a wo-
man must prove a male worker in her position122 would not have
been subjected to the harassment. Because sexual harassment
cases fall under "disparate treatment" theory,123 a plaintiff would
normally be required to show that her harasser had a subjective
intent or motive12 4 to discriminate against women.125 In quid pro
120. By creating models of behavior for women workers that require essentially
"prudish" and asexual behavior, courts can force women workers to isolate them-
selves from socializing at work, leaving themselves even more vulnerable to the
harassment they are trying to avoid.
121. Fortunately, some courts have been able to identify this point: "A person's
private and consensual sexual activities do not constitute a waiver of his or her
legal protections against unwelcome and unsolicited sexual harassment." Katz v.
Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 254 n.3 (4th Cir. 1983) (plaintiff's use of sexual nicknames with
male co-worker did not bar sexual harassment claim).
122. See MacKinnon, supra note 5, at 101-41 for a discussion of legal constructs
for sex discrimination. MacKinnon specifically challenges the assumption that
male and female workers are similarly situated and can be compared in a "differ-
ences" approach.
123. Disparate treatment theory applies to situations where the employer liter-
ally treats workers differently because of their race, sex, etc. Disparate impact the-
ory, in contrast, addresses employment practices which are facially neutral, but
impact more harshly on one group than another and are not justified by business
necessity. See generally MacKinnon, supra note 5, at 192-208; Barbara Lindemann
Schlei & Paul Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law (1976).
124. Intent under title VII disparate treatment means actual, subjective discrimi-
natory intent. See, e.g., United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460
U.S. 711 (1983); Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981);
Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Sweeney v. Board of Trustees, 569 F.2d 169 (1st Cir.
1978), vacated, 439 U.S. 24 (1978), cert. denied 444 U.S. 1045 (1980). For a similar
rule on intent in constitutional litigation, see Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney,
442 U.S. 256 (1979); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
125. Title VII plaintiffs actually may establish a prima facie case with a lesser
evidentiary showing than would be required to prevail on the merits. Once a plain-
tiff establishes a prima facie case, she creates a rebuttable presumption of unlawful
discrimination. The burden of production then shifts to the defendant to introduce
legitimate explanations for the treatment plaintiff received. United States Postal
Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (1983); Texas Dep't of Community




quo cases, however, courts assume sexual harassment happens to
women workers because of their sex. Courts do not require plain-
tiffs to meet the subjective intent standards imposed on other dis-
parate treatment claims because courts acknowledge that sexual
demands are not made of male workers.126 On the other hand, in
environmental sexual harassment cases, courts are unwilling to as-
sume that those who created the hostile or offensive environment
intended to discriminate against women. Plaintiffs proceeding
under an environmental theory must show the work environment
is specifically hostile to women in general, or to the plaintiff in
particular.127
1. Quid pro quo sexual harassment.
Because courts recognize the sexually harassing behavior is
motivated by a plaintiff's sex, the question becomes: was the
plaintiff's economic harm the result of the sexual harassment or
the result of a valid job consideration? 128 Theoretically, the con-
nection between the plaintiff's economic harm and her sex is ana-
lytically distinct from the link between that economic harm and a
term or condition of a plaintiff's job. Practically, the plaintiff's
proof of each of these elements is the same.129
Courts apply traditional rules of causation to determine
whether a plaintiff's injury resulted from her refusal to comply
with her harasser's sexual demands.130 The test is, but for plain-
126. For example, in Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977), the court
rejected defendant's "clever" argument that discrimination in the form of sexual
harassment was not based on sex, but rather on the plaintiff's refusal to comply
with sexual demands, a sex-neutral criteria. The court acknowledged the sexual
demands would never have been made of a male employee. Accord Williams v.
Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd on other grounds sub noma. Williams v.
Bell, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978). Courts have consistently bypassed rigid intent
requirements, finding it easy to infer sex discrimination, Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d
934, 943 (D.C. Cir. 1981), and comment that it is "obvious that the supervisor did
not treat male employees in a similar fashion." Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d
897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982). Note that plaintiffs may face proof problems under title
VII if the harasser makes overtures to workers of both sexes. For a discussion of
bisexual harassment, see generally MacKinnon, supra note 5, at 200-06.
127. See infra text accompanying notes 133-135.
128. See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982); Bundy v. Jack-
son, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
129. Although the courts discuss this element of plaintiff's case with the lan-
guage of intent, that is, stating she must prove intentional discrimination, the sub-
stantive requirements plaintiffs must actually meet are not the same as the
subjective discriminatory intent standard applied in most disparate treatment cases.
See supra note 124. In fact, the analysis courts utilize in discussing this element in
a quid pro quo case is identical to the analysis relied upon in the "term or condi-
tion" element. See in-fra text accompanying notes 136-149.
130. See, e.g., Mt. Healthy City School Dist Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274
(1977); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Mark Brodin, The Standard
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tiff's refusal, would the economic injury have occurred? Proof of
causation can be difficult in sexual harassment cases. The plain-
tiff's work performance often declines as a result of harassment
and the tension it causes. For example, an employer's claim that it
fired the plaintiff because of her poor attendance record rather
than her refusal to comply with sexual demands may be factually
correct and a legitimate basis for dismissal. Ironically, a plaintiff's
poor attendance may result from the harassment. In Hill v. BASF
Wyandotte Corp., the court actually denied recovery to a sexual
harassment plaintiff whose employer put forth "legitimate" rea-
sons for her job loss even though the reasons given could be traced
to the sexual harassment.13 1
2. Environmental sexual harassment.
Unlike quid pro quo plaintiffs, environmental harassment
plaintiffs must show that the environment is intended to be hostile
toward them as women, and not simply that an already offensive
environment disproportionately impacts upon them as women.
The result is an unstated requirement that the plaintiff be singled
out in some manner for adverse treatment. For example, courts
denied recovery in environmental harassment cases because the
workplace atmosphere was equally offensive to all workers, male
and female alike.132 In one case, the court could not recognize the
link between the hostile environment at work and the plaintiff's
sex because the work atmosphere at the plant did not change as a
result of the plaintiff's employment-it was offensive even before
she started work.133 Courts conclude that offensive working envi-
ronments discriminate on the basis of sex only if created with the
intent to offend a member of a protected group of workers; it is
not enough that those environments simply exist. As one court
noted, "[O]ff color remarks and innuendos are part and parcel of a
of Causation in the Mixed-Motive Title VII Action: A Social Policy Perspective, 82
Colum. L. Rev. 292 (1982).
131. 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 67 (E.D. Mich. 1981). The plaintiff was
fired for an uncooperative attitude and declining work performance despite the sex-
ual harassment she experienced that caused those problems.
132. The requirement that plaintiff show intentionally discriminatory harass-
ment can also be seen in racial harassment cases under title VII. Compare Walker
v. Ford Motor Co., 684 F.2d 1355 (11th Cir. 1982) (recovery granted because harass-
ment was part of a converted pattern aimed at plaintiff) with Vaughn v. Pool Off-
shore Co., 683 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1982) (recovery denied because the workplace
atmosphere was generally obnoxious to all employees despite racist comments
aimed at plaintiff).




construction site environment and are to be expected."134
Although courts have held an offensive working environment
can itself be illegal under title VII, they are still unwilling to find a
particular workplace environment discriminatory unless it is cre-
ated and maintained with the intention to offend. In environmen-
tal cases, in order to establish the requisite intent, plaintiffs
apparently must be singled out as targets for harassment in
scenarios which approximate the quid pro quo model.135 Despite
the unequal impact a sexist and hostile work environment has on
women workers, courts are unwilling to assume intentional dis-
crimination in environmental cases as they do in quid pro quo har-
assment. The potential advantages of the environmental theory
are minimized by the courts' inability to understand that the
harassing environment results from the same attitudes and percep-
tions about women workers present in quid pro quo sexual de-
mands. In both quid pro quo and environmental harassment,
women workers are harassed because of their sex.
C. Harassment Affecting a Term or Condition of
Employment
This element is the heart of the prima facie case. A plaintiff
must show a nexus between the sexual harassment and the em-
ployment context. 36 This can be done in one of two ways: either
by showing direct employer retaliation following the plaintiff's re-
action to harassment (quid pro quo) or by proving a pattern of con-
duct pervasive enough to alter working conditions and to interfere
with an employee's psychological well-being (environmental sex-
ual harassment).13 7 Quid pro quo harassment causes a measurable
134. Cummings v. Walsh Constr. Co., 561 F. Supp. 872, 878 (S.D. Ga. 1983).
135. E.g., Barrett v. Omaha Nat'l Bank, 726 F.2d 424 (8th Cir. 1984) (recovery de-
nied on other grounds); Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1983); Henson v. City of
Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir.
1981); Davis v. Western-Southern Life Ins., 33 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 34, 35
(N.D. Ohio 1984) (recovery denied on other grounds); Ferguson v. E.I. duPont de
Nemours & Co., 560 F. Supp. 1172 (D. Del. 1983) (recovery denied on other
grounds); Lamb v. Drilco, 32 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 105 (S.D. Tex. 1983);
Coley v. Consol. Rail Corp., 561 F. Supp. 645 (E.D. Mich. 1982); Robson v. Eva's
Super Mkt., 538 F. Supp. 857 (N.D. Ohio 1982); Walter v. KFGO Radio, 518 F. Supp.
1309 (D. N.D. 1981).
136. Factually, the plaintiff's burden of showing the harassment was a term or
condition of employment is satisfied when she establishes the causation require-
ment of the intent element of the prima facie case-that the refusal caused the eco-
nomic injury (quid pro quo) or that the environment was intended to be hostile
toward women or the individual plaintiff (environmental harassment). Analyti-
cally, these two elements of the plaintiff's case are distinct.
137. See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982); Coley v. Con-
solidated Rail Corp., 561 F. Supp. 645 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
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detrimental effect on a term or condition of employment such as a
lost promotion, raise, or the job itself. Environmental sexual har-
assment affects the intangible condition of the quality of working
life. A closer look at the application of these paradigms reveals
that in both environmental sexual harassment and quid pro quo
cases plaintiffs must show some type of material, quantifiable in-
jury. The doctrinal rationales for requiring such evidence, how-
ever, differ considerably.
1. Quid pro quo sexual harassment.
Plaintiffs must satisfy a two-part test to prove quid pro quo
sexual harassment affected a tangible job condition: 1) the plain-
tiff was otherwise entitled to the benefit she did not receive or not
otherwise entitled to a detriment; and 2) the plaintiff's reaction to
the sexual harassment caused the resulting loss of benefit or im-
posed detriment.138 Both parts of the test are difficult to prove.
The first part of the test requires a worker to establish her right to
a particular employment benefit (or to be protected from an im-
posed penalty)-it asks an employee to prove her worth as a
worker. This burden is a heavy one because employers can always
assert other "legitimate" reasons to explain the adverse treatment
the plaintiff received. These reasons range from subjective expla-
nations that are difficult to refute, such as attitude, personality,
and responsiveness to criticism, to more objective excuses, such as
poor work record, high absentee rates, or business necessity.139
Unless a plaintiff has an outstanding record and a "Pollyanna"
personality, countering such pretexts is virtually impossible.140
Even in situations where sexual harassment caused the high ab-
senteeism or uncooperative attitude, courts have found the em-
ployer's action legitimate. 141
Once the plaintiff successfully claims her right to the denied
benefit, she still must prove she was deprived of that right because
138. See Phillips v. Smalley Maintenance Servs., Inc., 711 F.2d 1524 (11th Cir.
1983); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982).
139. Compare Hill v. BASF Wyandotte Corp., 27 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 67
(E.D. Mich. 1981) (subjective explanation for terminating plaintiff) with Hall v.
P.O. Thacker Co., 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1499 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (objective
explanation).
140. E.g., Hill v. BASF Wyandotte Corp., 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 67
(E.D. Mich. 1981) (plaintiff unable to overcome employer charge of uncooperative
attitude and poor performance evaluations). But see Phillips v. Smalley Mainte-
nance Servs., Inc., 711 F.2d 1524 (11th Cir. 1983) (employer discharge of plaintiff
due to labor force reduction was a mere pretext as employer hired other employees
with similar qualifications soon after layoff).




of her response to the sexual harassment.142 Misconceptions about
sexual harassment surface at this stage of the inquiry as courts
again attempt to distinguish between demands and more benign
requests for sex. Frequently, courts dismiss sexual harassment
claims with a reassuring observation that the harasser's acts were
not a condition the plaintiff had to meet; all would have gone
smoothly had she simply refused.143 This response assumes men
and women occupy equal roles in sexual and economic relation-
ships. This assumption is incorrect. Male sexual dominance is ac-
cepted by many144 and regarded as biologically "natural"'145 by
others; male economic control is also a fact despite growing recog-
nition of the need for women to work.146 To refuse a male super-
visor's' 4 7 demand for sex means confronting his power on both of
these fronts and facing the probability that the subtle harassment
or unassuming request will escalate to more blatant and serious ac-
tions.148 Courts do not acknowledge the difficulty of refusal. Con-
sequently, if the harasser does not couple his sexual demands with
some explicit indication of a job-related threat, the demands will
not be considered a term or condition of employment, regardless of
the social reality which gives those demands meaning and force.149
2. Environmental sexual harassment.
For environmental sexual harassment to affect the term or
condition of employment described as "psychological well-be-
ing,"150 "it must be sufficiently pervasive so as to alter the condi-
142. See supra text accompanying notes 128-131 (discussion on causation).
143. E.g., Clark v. World Airways, 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 305 (D.D.C.
1980) (found advances were not a condition of employment although the harasser
was president of the company and it was plaintiff's first week of work).
144. Members of the Moral Majority and the New Right clearly hold philoso-
phies which favor continued male dominance. See, e.g., William Goodman Jr. &
James Price, Jerry Falwell, An Unauthorized Profile at 133-40 (1981).
145. See, e.g., MacKinnon, supra note 5, at 90-92; Sandra Tangri, Martha Burt &
Leaner Johnson, Sexual Harassment at Work.- Three Explanatory Models, 38 J. Soc.
Issues 33, 35-37 (1982).
146. See supra note 31.
147. This could just as easily apply to male co-workers, but this scenario is not
contemplated by the courts in the quid pro quo model. See supra notes 69-71 and
accompanying text.
148. See, e.g., Advocacy, supra note 2; Merit Systems, supra note 10, at 63-74.
149. In Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981), the court explicitly ac-
knowledged the difficulty and futility of requiring a plaintiff to prove her resist-
ance to sexual advances. The court noted: "She might be able to contrive proof of
rejection by objecting to the employer's advances in some very visible and dramatic
way, but she would do so only at the risk of making her life on the job even more
miserable." Id. at 946.
150. See, e.g., Rogers v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 454 F.2d 234
(5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972); accord Henson v. City of Dundee,
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tions of employment and create an abusive working environment
... sufficiently severe and persistent to affect seriously the psycho-
logical well being of employees."151 In Bundy v. Jackson ,152 the
District of Columbia Circuit was the first federal court to accept
the environmental theory. The court's stated rationale was to pro-
vide relief for sexual harassment victims who had to endure gener-
alized abuse, rather than submit to particular sexual demands as a
condition of employment.153
Because the harassment must be "pervasive," both the quan-
tity and quality of harassment are critical factors in environmental
sexual harassment cases. Whereas one encounter may be suffi-
cient to establish quid pro quo harassment if an employee's refusal
sparks retaliation, environmental sexual harassment by definition
cannot be a "lone incident."'154 Although the exact quantum of
harassment necessary to trigger the protection of title VII is un-
clear, recent case law suggests courts rely on certain factors to de-
termine the acceptable level of harassment.
Most common, courts measure the frequency and duration of
the harassment. Harassment becomes a "term or condition" of
employment when it is "standard operating procedure"'155 or part
of a history or pattern of offensive treatment. 156 In such cases, the
alleged harassing comments, remarks, and behavior occurred on a
daily basis157 for long periods of time.158 Sexist and abusive state-
ments, or even unwanted touching and requests for sex, will not
support recovery under the environmental sexual harassment the-
682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982); Carroll v. Talman Fed. Say. & Loan, 604 F.2d 1028
(7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 929 (1980).
151. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982).
152. 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
153. Id. at 945.
154. Reichman v. Bureau of Affirmative Action, 536 F. Supp. 1149, 1177 (M.D.
Pa. 1982).
155. Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
156. See, e.g., Downes v. Federal Aviation Administration, 775 F.2d 288 (Fed. Cir.
1985); Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1983); Morgan v. Hertz Corp., 542 F. Supp.
123 (W.D Tenn. 1981).
157. Generally, daily harassment occurs when regular contact between the har-
asser and plaintiff is necessary to fulfilling workplace responsibilities. See, e.g.,
Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982) (plaintiff was dispatcher,
and harasser was immediate supervisor); Davis v. Western-Southern Life Ins., 33
Empl. Prac Dec. (CCH) 34, 35 (N.D. Ohio 1984) (plaintiff was insurance sales rep-
resentative, and harasser was associate sales manager); Coley v. Consolidated Rail
Corp., 561 F. Supp. 645 (E.D. Mich. 1982) (plaintiff was switch bill and supply clerk,
and harasser was assistant manager and immediate supervisor).
158. E.g., Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982) (two year pe-




ory if occurring infrequently.159
Some courts consider the severity of the harassment a rele-
vant criterion, but consider "severe" only situations where the har-
asser demands sex and uses implicit physical (as opposed to
economic) force to reinforce his power. If the harassment is severe
enough, courts overlook the quantity requirement. For example,
in Robson v. Eva's Super Market,160 the plaintiff's supervisor
grabbed her, pulled at her blouse, and patted her buttocks. In Rob-
son, the court allowed recovery despite the relatively isolated oc-
currence of the harassment primarily because the factual scenario
mirrored a quid pro quo case. 161 As in the typical quid pro quo sce-
nario, one man directed explicit sexual advances to the plaintiff.
Unlike a quid pro quo case, however, the plaintiff's objection to
the treatment did not lead to direct or immediate economic loss.
In cases like Robson, the most immediate threat to the woman is
physical. A few courts have recognized that verbal harassment can
be as threatening as physical punishment,162 but generally it is not
considered severe enough to bypass the imposed quantity
requirements.
The severity, duration, or frequency of the harassment osten-
sibly determines the courts' factual assessment 163 of whether the
harassment is a term or condition of employment. A close exami-
nation of patterns of recovery in environmental cases reveals that
quid pro quo sexual harassment doctrine' 64 and traditional legal
assumptions about what constitutes legally recognizable harm165
also affect the analysis. On the one hand, courts have held harass-
ing behavior itself violates title VII; on the other hand, they have
looked to its quantifiable and tangible effects on work to deter-
159. Recovery was denied in Ferguson v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 560 F.
Supp. 1172 (D. Del. 1983); Walter v. KFGO Radio, 518 F. Supp. 1309 (D.N.D. 1981).
160. 538 F. Supp. 857 (N.D. Ohio 1982).
161. Id. at 864.
162. As one court commented: "The words used were ones widely recognized as
not only improper but as intensely degrading, deriving their power to wound not
only from their meaning but also from the 'disgust and violence they express pho-
netically.' " Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 254 (4th Cir. 1983) (quoting C. Miller & K.
Swift, Words and Women 109 (1977)).
163. Both case law and the EEOC guidelines provide for a case by case determi-
nation of whether alleged conduct constitutes sexual harassment, depending on the
record as a whole and the totality of the circumstances. 29 C.F.R. 1604.11(b) (1985);
Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982).
164. In particular, there is a requirement that plaintiff suffer tangible and quan-
tifiable harm.
165. The law has been slow to protect interests that when damaged are hard to
repair economically or to measure in definite and quantifiable ways. This pattern is
slowly changing as evidenced by relatively recent developments in tort (intentional
infliction of emotional distress) and contract (promissory estoppel) law.
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mine if the behavior is the kind of harassment which, standing
alone, qualifies as discrimination.166 In cases where plaintiffs have
successfully shown environmental harassment to be a term or con-
dition of their employment, they either quit their jobs because of
the harassment16 7 or suffered such mental and emotional duress
that their ability to function effectively dropped signficantly.168
The type of evidence required to prove that environmental
sexual harassment is a condition of employment places these plain-
tiffs in the same posture as those with quid pro quo claims. When
the legal doctrine is stripped away, it becomes clear women are
losing their jobs because of sexual harassment, whether they quit
or get fired. Although environmental sexual harassment theory
was designed to broaden the types of sexist treatment prohibited
by title VII, its potential is limited by the "quid pro quo-colored
lenses" the courts persist in wearing. In an effort to balance em-
ployers' obligations and women workers' rights, courts have re-
turned to the traditional indicium of harm: tangible evidence of
loss or suffering that deserves compensation. As a result, the main
difference between environmental sexual harassment and quid pro
quo harassment boils down to who grows tired of the harassment
first: in quid pro quo cases, the employer fires or demotes the
worker, and in environmental sexual harassment cases, the
worker quits of her own accord or has an emotional breakdown.
The most important contribution of Bundy v. Jackson 169 to
judicial understanding of sexual harassment was a new conception
of terms and conditions of employment. In acknowledging the
right to psychological well-being as an employer-owed obliga-
tion,170 the Bundy court implicitly recognized that two separate
166. See Reichman v. Bureau of Affirmative Action, 536 F. Supp. 1149 (M.D. Pa.
1982); Walter v. KFGO Radio, 518 F. Supp. 1309 (D.N.D. 1981), for cases where
plaintiff's job performance remained stable, leading to the conclusion that the envi-
ronment was not sufficiently offensive to be illegal. See also Ukarish v. Magnesium
Elektron, 31 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1317 (D.N.J. 1983); Hill v. BASF Wyan-
dotte Corp., 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 67 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
167. E.g., Coley v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 561 F. Supp. 645 (E.D. Mich. 1982);
Robson v. Eva's Super Mkt., 538 F. Supp. 857 (N.D. Ohio 1982). In these cases, the
courts examined plaintiff's case in light of standards governing constructive dis-
charge, i.e., were working conditions so difficult or unpleasant that a reasonable
person in the employee's shoes would have felt compelled to resign. See, e.g., Held
v. Gulf Oil, 684 F.2d 427 (6th Cir. 1982); Rosado v. Santiago, 651 F.2d 114 (1st Cir.
1977); Jacobs v. Martin Sweets Co., 550 F.2d 364 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 431
U.S. 917 (1977).
168. See Lamb v. Drilco, 32 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 105, 106 (S.D. Tex.
1983) (plaintiff's earlier outstanding performance as quality assurance inspector de-
clined because of verbal and physical harassment by her supervisor).
169. 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
170. Id. at 944-45.
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power systems merge to create the problem of sexual harass-
ment-male dominance over women 171 and economic control of
owners, supervisors, and managers over workers.172 By recogniz-
ing that sexual harassment discriminates against women workers
even without tangible job losses, environmental sexual harassment
theory gives legal meaning to a social reality familiar to women:
men harass and create barriers for women in the work place by
virtue of male power alone. The economic insecurity of women in
general 173 coupled with male control and dominance in general
create sexual harassment, which is a condition of employment to
its victims.
Environmental sexual harassment theory represents an im-
portant advance in legal analysis of sexual harassment because it
recognizes the dual origins of the discrimination-sexual power
and economic power-and accepts that women have the right to
work free from the abuses of both.174 Despite the growing focus
on tangible evidence of the effects of environmental harassment,
the doctrine still contemplates a view of compensable injury drawn
from the experiences of working women. It begins to clarify the
confusion about what type of conflict sexual harassment truly
represents.175
D. Employer Liability for the Harassment
In title VII employment discrimination cases, courts gener-
ally apply the common law theory of respondeat superior to deter-
mine employer liability: employers are strictly and vicariously
liable for discriminatory acts of supervisory personnel that are
within the scope of employment.176 The traditional title VII stan-
dard for scope of employment is broader than at common law be-
171. See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
172. See supra note 46.
173. See MacKinnon, supra note 5, at 9-23. In addition to lower wages, less
skilled job classifications, and higher rates of unemployment, women workers who
maintain families face more serious economic difficulties than their male counter-
parts. See, e.g., Dep't of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bulletin No. 2168, Wo-
men at Work: A Chartbook at 27 (1983) (35% of families maintained by women
were in poverty; 7% of families maintained by married couples). Dep't of Labor,
Women's Bureau, Facts About Women Heads of Households and Heads of Families
7 (1979) (median income for female-headed families in 1977 was $7,765; comparable
figure for male-headed families was $17,517).
174. See Morgan v. Hertz Corp., 542 F. Supp. 123, 128 (W.D. Tenn. 1981) (injunc-
tion issued to prevent supervisors from making vulgar comments about sex because
female employees had the right to work free from such abuse).
175. See supra part I.
176. Although these courts refer to this standard of liability as strict liability, it
should not be confused with the tort law standard of strict liability which creates
liability in the absence of fault. See Prosser, supra note 105, at 75.
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cause the legislative aim of the statute is to prevent and prohibit
discrimination, not punish employers. In Griggs v. Duke Power
Co. ,177 the Supreme Court noted that the primary objective of title
VII was prophylactic: "It was [designed] to achieve equality of em-
ployment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in
the past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over
other employees."' 178 To enforce the compensatory purpose of title
VII's provisions, courts impose stringent obligations on
employers.' 79
Until recently, courts have not found liability in sexual har-
assment cases under traditional title VII respondeat superior the-
ory for two primary reasons. First, courts characterize sexual
harassment as outside the scope of the harasser's employment.18o
Courts believe that the harassing behavior stems from the individ-
ual's sex drive, rather than from a desire for greater control on the
job.181 For example, one case contrasted sexual harassment by an
employee with an automobile accident by noting "the injury to the
pedestrian [in a car wreck] is not caused because of an attempt by
the driver to gratify his own desires ."182 The courts must be refer-
ring to the sexual desires it assumes a harasser seeks to fulfill.
Second, sexual harassment is not officially proposed or
promulgated by company policy, unlike some other types of em-
ployment discrimination. In a sex discrimination suit based on un-
equal wages, the employer's role is typically to set the wage rate.
The legal issue thus centers on whether those wage rates are ac-
ceptable.' 83 In contrast, the employer's role in most sexual harass-
ment actions, at least initially, is indirect, 8 4 for example,
maintaining an organization which allows sexual harassment to
exist by virtue of a male-dominated, hierarchical structure. 8 5
Many courts have simply been unwilling to impose liability solely
177. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
178. Id. at 429-30.
179. See Vermeulen, supra note 77, at 504.
180. Id. at 510-11.
181. For discussion concerning men who harass-their profiles and their rea-
sons-see Alliance Against Sexual Coercion, Men Who Harass (1981); Merit Sys-
tems, supra note 10, at 57-62; MacKinnon, supra note 5, at 163-64.
182. Vinson v. Taylor, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 38, 42 (D.D.C. 1980) (em-
phasis added), rev'd, 753 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1985), Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 106
S. Ct. 2399 (1986).
183. See Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1982).
184. The employer's role is indirect, in contrast to a later and more "direct" role
such as refusing to investigate or adequately respond to allegations of sexual
harassment.
185. See Tangri, Burt & Johnson, supra note 145, at 37-40.
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on that basis.1 86
The courts' confusion about the employer's role (as opposed
to the harasser's role) in causing or allowing sexual harassment
has resulted in the uneven and unpredictable use of three differ-
ent rules for employer liability: 1) liability based on respondeat
superior as utilized in the title VII context;1 8 7 2) liability for super-
visors' acts unless the employer has a policy against sexual harass-
ment, no knowledge of the harassment, and acts to remedy the
discrimination immediately upon notice;18 8 and 3) no liability un-
less plaintiff shows the employer knew or should have known
about the harassment and failed to take prompt action to prevent
and stop it.189 Courts rely primarily on the first and third of these
rules.190 Recent case law reveals an emerging consensus as to
186. As one court noted: "Title VII is directed at acts of employment discrimina-
tion and not at individual acts of discrimination. Therefore, individual acts of sex-
ual harassment by employees of a defendant employer are not actionable, unless
they are in some manner, whether actively or tacitly, sanctioned by the employer
or constitute an official policy of the employer." Ludington v. Sambo's Restaurants,
Inc., 474 F. Supp. 480, 483 (E.D. Wis. 1979). But see Horn v. Duke Homes, 755 F.2d
599, 604-05 (7th Cir. 1985) (court rejected defendant's argument that sexual harass-
ment is an individual act rather than the employer's act because the individual's
identity is merged with the employer to create the legal concept of "employer";
analysis applied only to harassment by supervisor).
187. Title VII respondeat superior provides that employers are vicariously liable
for discriminatory acts of supervisory personnel that are within the scope of em-
ployment. For application of this standard to quid pro quo harassment, see Horn v.
Duke Homes, 755 F.2d 599, 605 (7th Cir. 1985); Crimm v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 750
F.2d 703, 710 (8th Cir. 1984); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 908 (11th Cir.
1982); Miller v. Bank of Am., 600 F.2d 211, 213 (9th Cir. 1981); cf. Barnes v. Costle,
561 F.2d 983, 993 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (court noted that the employer could overcome
this "strict liability" by acting to correct the sexual harassment when notified).
188. E.g., Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 943 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Barnes v. Costle,
561 F.2d 983, 1001 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (MacKinnon, J., concurring).
189. This standard has been applied primarily in environmental sexual harass-
ment cases. See, e.g., Barrett v. Omaha Nat'l Bank, 726 F.2d 424 (8th Cir. 1984);
Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1983); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897,
905 (11th Cir. 1982); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Davis v. West-
ern-Southern Life Ins., 33 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 34,235 (N.D. Ohio 1984); Fer-
guson v. E.I. duPont de Nemours, 560 F. Supp. 1172 (D. Del. 1983); Lamb v. Drilco,
32 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 105 (S.D. Tex. 1983); Ukarish v. Magnesium Elek-
tron, 31 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1315 (D.N.J. 1983); Coley v. Consolidated Rail
Corp., 561 F. Supp. 645, 649-50 (E.D. Mich. 1982); Vinson v. Taylor, 23 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 37 (D.D.C. 1980), rev'd, 753 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (circuit court
adopted standard of strict liability), aff'd on other grounds sub. non. Meritor Say.
Bank v. Vinson, 106 S. Ct. 2399 (1986) (Supreme Court rejects strict liability stan-
dard). For application of this standard to quid pro quo claims, see Craig v. Y & Y
Snacks, 721 F.2d 77 (3d Cir. 1983); Cummings v. Walsh Constr. Co., 561 F. Supp. 872
(S.D. Ga. 1983).
190. The second standard has only been used in two cases, both in the D.C. Cir-
cuit. Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983
(D.C. Cir. 1977). No court has applied this standard since the ruling in Henson v.
City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982).
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which standard should govern in a particular case: respondeat su-
perior "strict liability" should apply in quid pro quo cases,191 and
the third test, which frequently provides immunity to employers,
in environmental sexual harassment cases.1 92
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Meritor Savings
Bank v. Vinson 193 does not resolve this confusion about which
standard of employer liability is applicable to the two types of sex-
ual harassment. The Court did not delineate a clear test for em-
ployer liability for environmental harassment, and did not discuss
liability for quid pro quo harassment at all. The majority opinion
stops short of issuing a definitive rule on employer liability and in-
stead briefly discusses the factors that might be relevant to liabil-
ity. The discussion in Meritor does, however, support the
emerging consensus about the proper standards for liability.194
This section examines the application of these standards and criti-
ques the stated rationales for applying different standards of em-
ployer liability to the two types of harassment.
1. Quid pro quo sexual harassment.
In Henson v. City of Dundee, the court held that an employer
is strictly liable for all quid pro quo harassment by its supervi-
sors.' 95 Before Henson, only two courts' 96 had adopted the strict
liability standard despite general title VII law and the EEOC
guidelines 197 favoring strict liability. Basing its holding on tradi-
tional title VII authority and public policy, the Henson court noted
that "[t]he modern corporate entity consists of the individuals who
manage it, and little, if any, progress in eradicating discrimination
191. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 106 S. Ct. 2399 (1986) does not address liabil-
ity for quid pro quo harassment. For examples of the strict liability standard ap-
plied to quid pro quo cases, see Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir.
1982); accord Horn v. Duke Homes, 755 F.2d 599 (7th Cir. 1985) (court held strict
liability is correct standard for quid pro quo harassment by supervisors); Crimm v.
Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 750 F.2d 703 (8th Cir. 1984) (court held district court did not
abuse discretion in applying respondeat superior strict liability standard for quid
pro quo harassment); Miller v. Bank of Am., 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1981); Barnes v.
Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 993 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Although this represents a clear trend in
quid pro quo employer liability standards, it is not absolute. Courts which deviate
from this trend tend to impose the third test, knowledge and failure to act, in all
cases. See cases cited supra note 187.
192. See supra note 189 for examples of this standard applied to environmental
harassment cases.
193. 106 S. Ct. 2399 (1986).
194. See infra notes 201-203 and accompanying text for a discussion of Meitor's
treatment of employer liability.
195. 682 F.2d 897, 910 (11th Cir. 1982).
196. Miller v. Bank of Am., 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979); Barnes v. Costle, 561
F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
197. 29 C.F.R. § 16 0 4.11(c) (1985).
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in employment will be made if the corporate employer is able to
hide behind the shield of individual employee action."' 9 8 Since
Henson, some courts continue to apply the more lenient test of no
liability without knowledge and failure to act, although these
courts state in dictum they would have utilized Henson's strict lia-
bility standard if the more lenient standard they applied had
barred plaintiff's recovery.i 99
There is no reason to assume the Henson strict liability stan-
dard for quid pro quo harassment will change based on the
Supreme Court's decision in Meitor Savings Bank v. Vinson .2o
The issue presented to the Court in Meritor specifically dealt with
liability for a hostile environment created by a supervisor, and the
Court's comments thus apply only to that limited scenario.
2. Environmental sexual harassment.
The standard for employer liability in environmental harass-
ment cases is not as clear as the standard in quid pro quo cases.
Although courts disagree on what the standard should be, a con-
sensus exists on what the standard should not be: courts uni-
formly reject respondeat superior as a test for liability in
environmental harassment. In Meritor, the Supreme Court re-
jected the District of Columbia Court of Appeals' holding that em-
ployers should be liable for environmental harassment by
supervisors regardless of the employer's knowledge. The majority
of the Court thus held that employers are not always automati-
cally liable for their supervisor's environmental sexual
harassment. 20 '.
It is important to note that four Justices joined in a concur-
ring opinion 202 that rejects the notion of two different standards of
employer liability for two types of harassment, and holds that no
justification exists for a special rule to be applied only in environ-
198. 682 F.2d at 909 (quoting Tidwell v. American Oil Co., 332 F. Supp. 424, 436
(D. Utah 1971)).
199. E.g., Craig v. Y & Y Snacks, Inc., 721 F.2d 77, 80-81 (3d Cir. 1983); Toscano v.
Nimmo, 570 F. Supp. 1197 (D. Del. 1983); Cummings v. Walsh Constr. Co., 561 F.
Supp. 872 (S.D. Ga. 1983).
200. 106 S. Ct. 2399 (186).
201. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 106 S. Ct. 2399, 2408 (1986).
202. Justice Marshall authored the concurrence with Justices Brennan, Black-
mun, and Stevens joining. Justice Stevens wrote separately that he saw no incon-
sistency between the majority and concurring opinions. This author respectfully
disagrees with Justice Stevens in that regard. While Marshall's concurrence holds
that all supervisory acts of sexual harassment should be imputed to the employer,




mental harassment cases.203 As such, the concurring Justices
would automatically impute liability to the employer for all sexual
harassment. The significance of the concurrence in Meritor is un-
known. The majority of the Court did not adopt a "definitive rule
on employer liability,"204 but explicitly rejected the notion that
employers are automatically liable for their supervisor's sexual
harassment. Thus, the concurrence, at best, reflects a trend the
Court might adopt in the future; it does not represent the current
state of the law.
Prior to Meritor, the various courts of appeals applied a test
in environmental harassment cases which presumed no liability
unless a plaintiff shows employer knowledge of the harassment
and a failure to act.205 Meritor may alter this standard as the ma-
jority held that "absence of notice to an employer does not neces-
sarily insulate that employer from liability."206  The Court
suggested that lack of notice may not insulate employers who have
no policies, procedures, or practices that both encourage victims of
harassment to come forward and provide responsive solutions to
victims' complaints. Thus, the Meritor Court acknowledges the
difficult position of sexual harassment complainants and places
some of the burden on the employer to create an environment that
makes employer knowledge more, rather than less, likely.
Despite the Court's recent holding in Meritor, it is important
to analyze the pre-Meritor requirements for employer liability.
First, the holding of Meritor may be limited to situations where
the harasser is also the employee's supervisor and the sole repre-
sentative of the employer available to hear the victim's complaints.
Second, the Meritor Court does not hold that employer knowledge
of the harassment is unimportant; rather, the Court merely holds
that lack of knowledge is not dispositive. The Court still concurs
with prior precedent holding that strict liability does not apply,
and that employer knowledge and failure to act are primary con-
siderations in determining employer liability for environmental
harassment.
a. Employer knowledge of the harassment.
The primary factor influencing employer liability is employer
203. Meitor, 106 S. Ct. at 2411.
204. Id. at 2408.
205. See cases cited supra note 189. See also Horn v. Duke Homes, 755 F.2d 599,
603 n.2, 606 n.9 (7th Cir. 1985) (in dictum the court rejected respondeat superior for
environmental harassment).
206. 106 S. Ct. at 2409.
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knowledge-either actual or constructive-of the harassment. 207
Courts have not explicitly considered whose knowledge is suffi-
cient to bind the employer.208 Analysis of case law reveals the
only clear test yet developed: the plaintiff must inform someone
other than the harasser.20 9 Some courts have held that complaints
to company presidents and shift managers provided actual knowl-
edge;210 other courts determined that complaints to chief sales of-
ficers, district managers, and bank branch managers did not.211
Employer liability based solely on the harasser's knowledge
would approximate the respondeat superior standard of liability
which has been rejected in environmental cases. Requiring actual
knowledge by someone other than the harasser, however, produces
the ironic result of disadvantaging those employees who are unfor-
tunate enough to be harassed by top level supervisors. 212
When the plaintiff has not lodged a complaint with a supervi-
sor, courts focus on whether the employer should have known of
the harassment. A finding of constructive knowledge depends on
the extent of harassment, the same criterion plaintiffs must meet
to prove the harassment was a term or condition of their employ-
ment.213 The test asks if the sexual harassment is so widespread
that a reasonable employer in the defendant's shoes would know
about it.214 Other factors which influence a finding of constructive
207. E.g., Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 255 (4th Cir. 1983); Henson v. City of Dun-
dee, 682 F.2d 897, 905 (11th Cir. 1982).
208. For a discussion of whose knowledge might constitute employer knowledge,
see Ferguson v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 560 F. Supp. 1172, 1198-99 n.62 (D.
Del. 1983).
209. The Meritor decision suggests that a plaintiff may be relieved of some obli-
gation to inform the employer of harassment if the perpetrator of the harassment is
the only reasonably available employer representative. 106 S. Ct. at 2409.
210. E.g., Barrett v. Omaha Nat'l Bank, 726 F.2d 424, 426 (8th Cir. 1984) (bank
vice-president), ajf'g 584 F. Supp. 22 (D. Neb. 1983); Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 256
(4th Cir. 1983) (air traffic control center manager); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934,
940 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (department supervisor); Coley v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 561
F. Supp. 645, 648 (E.D. Mich. 1982) (shift manager); Robson v. Eva's Super Mkt., 538
F. Supp. 857, 860 (N.D. Ohio 1982) (company president).
211. Davis v. Western-Southern Life Ins. 33 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 34,235
(N.D. Ohio 1984) (district sales manager); Vinson v. Taylor, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 37, 42 (D.D.C. 1980) (bank branch manager); Ludington v. Sambo's Restau-
rants, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 480, 482 (E.D. Wis. 1979) (district office manager).
212. The higher up in the company hierarchy the harasser is, the harder it will
be for the employee to go above him and expect to be believed or supported in her
complaint. It is unrealistic to expect lower level employees to take top manage-
ment on, one-on-one, and win.
213. See supra notes 150-175 and accompanying text; see also cases cited infra
note 214.
214. See, e.g., Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 256 (4th Cir. 1983) (constructive knowl-
edge based on pattern of insults aimed at plaintiff); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682
F.2d 897, 899 (11th Cir. 1982) (constructive knowledge based on demeaning vulgari-
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knowledge are the employees' positions in the workplace hierar-
chy and the number of women workers affected by the harass-
ment.215 Thus far courts have not considered the effects of other
indicia on employer knowledge, such as the attitudes of employers
which blind them to obvious and ongoing harassment.216 Most
likely, only plaintiffs who establish that environmental sexual har-
assment is a term or condition of employment through the dura-
tion and frequency measures2 1 7 will be able to claim constructive
knowledge by the employer.
b. Failure to act.
Courts indicate what an employer must do once it has knowl-
edge of the harassment more clearly than what plaintiffs must do
to impart knowledge. The few cases in which the knowledge hur-
dle was crossed, but the defendant was nevertheless relieved of lia-
bility for his acts, suggest two duties owed by employers: the duty
to investigate and the concomitant duty to take immediate and ef-
fective action.218 The type of investigation employers must con-
duct has received much less attention than the type of remedial
action they must take. Employers must take both immediate and
effective action. For example, one employer fired the harasser,
but still incurred liability because the firing occurred more than
two months after receiving knowledge of the harassment.21 9 An-
ties over two years); Davis v. Western-Southern Life Ins. Co., 33 Empl. Prac. Dec.
(CCH) 34,235 (N.D. Ohio 1984) (no knowledge despite complaints because plain-
tiff did not explicitly term her treatment sexual harassment); Cummings v. Walsh
Constr. Co., 561 F. Supp. 872, 878 (S.D. Ga. 1983); Coley v. Consolidated Rail Corp.,
561 F. Supp. 645 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
215. E.g., Cumming v. Walsh Constr. Co., 561 F. Supp. 872, 876 (S.D. Ga. 1983)
(top supervisors were involved in creating the harassing environment); Morgan v.
Hertz Corp., 542 F. Supp. 123, 125 (W.D. Tenn. 1981) (harassing environment aimed
at all female employees in Hertz location). But see Davis v. Western-Southern Life
Ins., 33 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1 34,235 (N.D. Ohio 1984) (no constructive knowl-
edge despite fact that harasser was associate sales manager who harassed several
female employees).
216. One employer expressed the following attitude concerning the environment
at its workplace: "[O]ff-color remarks and innuendos are part and parcel of a con-
struction site environment and are to be expected." Cummings v. Walsh Constr.
Co., 561 F. Supp. 872, 878 (S.D. Ga. 1983).
217. As previously discussed, women who suffer from environmental harassment
may be unable to prove the requisite duration and frequency of harassment. See
supra notes 154-162 and accompanying text. To require such proof defeats the pur-
pose of recognizing this type of harassment. See supra text accompanying note 153.
218. Barrett v. Omaha Nat'l Bank, 726 F.2d 424, 426 (8th Cir. 1984) (employer
not liable because it reprimanded harasser, and supervisor failed to intervene); Fer-
guson v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 560 F. Supp. 1172, 1199 (D. Del. 1983) (em-
ployer not liable because employer investigated claims, took action, and harassment
stopped).
219. See Lamb v. Drilco, 32 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 105, 106 (S.D. Tex.
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other employer was liable despite policy statements and training
programs to counter sexual harassment because its efforts were
not effective at preventing the behavior. 220 In fact, the Supreme
Court noted in Meritor that a general antidiscrimination policy
that does not specifically address sexual harassment is not suffi-
cient to alert employees to their employer's interest in correcting
that form of discrimination.221 Once plaintiffs trigger these em-
ployer obligations by either complaining about the harassment or
enduring sufficient abuse to meet the constructive knowledge re-
quirements, their right to work free from sexual harassment will
generally be protected-either by successful, prompt employer ac-
tion or by the courts.
E. Summary of Environmental Harassment Prima
Facie Case
Courts assume that employers should not compensate women
for environmental harassment unless the employer has actual or
constructive knowledge of the harassment.22 2 The requirement
that the employer have knowledge of the harassment will fre-
quently bar relief. This burden is compounded by the proof neces-
sary to meet other elements of the prima facie case for
environmental harassment. The plaintiff must prove the intensity
or duration of the harassment was sufficient to alter the conditions
of employment. In the majority of cases, the plaintiff must show
tangible evidence of loss or suffering before courts will find the
harassment altered the conditions of employment. The plaintiff
must show an intent to discriminate. This element of the prima
facie case requires the plaintiff to demonstrate she was singled out
as a target for harassment. Placing these requirements on the
plaintiff defeats the purpose of judicial recognition of environmen-
tal harassment: to allow recovery for psychological harassment
that was legal under quid pro quo doctrine because it did not result
in direct economic harm to the individual woman worker. In re-
fusing to hold employers liable without a showing of an employer's
actual or constructive knowledge of the harassing environment,
courts have failed to recognize that women have a right to partici-
pate equally in their work environment.
1983) (termination of harasser not immediate enough despite only one day elapsing
after it received corroborating evidence of plaintiff's allegations).
220. Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 256 (4th Cir. 1983).
221. 106 S. Ct. at 2408-09.
222. Additionally, courts may compensate for such harassment if other unusual
circumstances exist. See supra note 209.
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IV. Judicial Explanations for Two Types of Sexual Harassment
The Henson court stated the justification for applying differ-
ent liability standards in quid pro quo and environmental sexual
harassment cases:
The capacity of any person to create a hostile or offensive en-
vironment is not necessarily enhanced or diminished by any
degree of authority which the employer confers on that indi-
vidual. When a supervisor gratuitously insults an employee,
he generally does so for his reasons and by his own means. He
thus acts outside the actual or apparent scope of the authority
he possesses as a supervisor.223
Courts continue to approach sexual harassment as two distinct
types of discrimination--environmental sexual harassment, which
is not based on an abuse of workplace authority, and quid pro quo
harassment, which can exist only when workplace authority is ex-
ercised. This approach rests on assumptions which are factually
and legally dishonest.
The idea that environmental sexual harassment does not in-
volve an abuse of economic authority stems from the judicial defi-
nition of environmental harassment. Courts define environmental
harassment as that which does not result in economic loss and as-
sume the harasser's ability to harm a woman's economic status,
that is whether a harasser is a supervisor or co-worker, is irrele-
vant. This limited understanding of environmental sexual harass-
ment ignores important realities. The reasons a supervisor
harasses a worker and the means he uses are the same regardless
of the type of harassment. Courts characterize environmental sex-
ual harassment by a supervisor as an individual man harassing "for
his reasons and by his own means" 224 and quid pro quo harassment
as a supervisor using the employer's means to extort sexual favors.
In fact, all acts of harassment by supervisors are affected and
strengthened by the superior economic position that supervisors
occupy. In both environmental as well as quid pro quo harass-
ment, a supervisor's economic control shapes the meaning and
force of his actions whether or not he flexes his economic mus-
cle.225 Thus, whenever a supervisor sexually harasses a woman
worker, male power and workplace authority combine to provide
223. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 910 (11th Cir. 1982). Since Henson,
other courts have relied on this explanation. E.g., Coley v. Consolidated Rail Corp.,
561 F. Supp. 645, 650 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
224. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 910 (11th Cir. 1982).
225. Marshall's concurrence in Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 106 S. Ct. 2399, 2409
(1986), recognizes exactly this point. Unfortunately, that concurrence does not re-
flect a widespread judicial assumption. For further discussion of the significance of
Marshall's concurrence, see supra notes 202-04 and accompanying text.
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greater freedom to harass and fewer opportunities for women to
resist.
Judicial inability to comprehend the economic coercion inher-
ent in environmental harassment by supervisors is especially ap-
palling given courts' increasing concern with tangible evidence of
the effects of environmental sexual harassment in the form of de-
clining work performance or a plaintiff's decision to quit her
job.226 The focus on environmental harassment's measurable im-
pact on a woman's job undercuts the Henson court's rationale for a
different standard in environmental sexual harassment cases. The
focus reintroduces the importance of a harasser's control at the
workplace and leaves recovery in all cases of co-worker harass-
ment open to question.2 27
Closely related to the notion that a supervisor's abuse of
workplace authority is irrelevant to environmental sexual harass-
ment is the equally incorrect assumption that a harasser's abuse of
workplace authority is required for quid pro quo harassment-that
only supervisors can demand sex in exchange for economic secur-
ity because only supervisors have economic chips for bargaining.
This conception fails to recognize: 1) ways in which nonsupervi-
sory male employees gain access to avenues of control; and 2) ways
in which threats of physical force or coercion can lead to economic
harm.228
Courts fail to recognize that male and economic power are
both expressed in both types of sexual harassment. Even more im-
portant, women workers' economic status is significantly affected
regardless of the source of power a harasser abuses. Supervisory
harassment always poses a greater threat, but co-worker harass-
ment is not unrelated to the power employers bestow on various
workers within the company. Although environmental sexual
harassment theory represents a tremendous advance in legal un-
derstanding of sexual harassment by recognizing that two aspects
of power are actually involved in sexual harassment, 229 the ad-
vances it offers are undercut by the courts' inability to grasp the
abuse of economic power inherent in environmental sexual harass-
226. See supra notes 163-68 and accompanying text for a discussion of the pat-
terns of recovery in environmental harassment cases.
227. As one court noted: "[I]t is undisputed that there was no alleged relation-
ship between the claimed sexual advances and remarks and any term or condition
of employment. The male in question was a Cost Engineer, as was plaintiff, and
was doing the same type of work." Smith v. Rust Eng'g Co., 18 Empl. Prac. Dec.
(CCH) 8698, 8698 (N.D. Ala. 1978).
228. For a concrete example of this situation, see supra text following note 20.
229. See supra text accompanying notes 169-175.
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ment and by the economic harm co-workers can cause in a quid
pro quo-type scenario.
V. Implications of the Two-Type Model
Environmental sexual harassment theory developed from the
need for a legal model that addressed the sexual harassment work-
ing women encountered. The theory met that challenge by focus-
ing on the psychological well-being of women workers and by
recognizing that men at all levels of the workplace hierarchy can,
and do, harass women in ways that bar women's equal participa-
tion at work. Nevertheless, courts continue to make analytical dis-
tinctions between sexual harassment as a form of economic
coercion (quid pro quo harassment) and harassment as sexual co-
ercion (environmental harassment). Although both types of har-
assment are recognized as illegal treatment of women at work, the
courts' failure to understand sexual harassment as an inextricable
expression of both types of coercion produces troubling results.
The advantages that environmental theory offers are undercut,
and the schism between sexual harassment as women experience
it and sexual harassment as the law defines it remains.
Analysis of a plaintiff's prima facie case under the environ-
mental theory shows she must either prove facts which could sup-
port a quid pro quo claim (particularly with regard to the elements
of intent and terms or conditions of employment), or she is left
with an environmental claim that the employer may not be re-
sponsible for compensating. The dichotomy results because the
distinction between quid pro quo and environmental harassment
for both definitional and liability purposes rests on the type of
power a harasser abuses-sexual or economic-rather than the in-
jury a woman worker suffers. The focus on the type of coercion at
issue is fundamentally unworkable because that distinction is irrel-
evant in the employment setting.
By juxtaposing the types of power in operation, the two-type
model has clouded the most important issue. Courts' concern
should be that harassment results from the second-class position
women occupy in society and at work. Harassment perpetuates
that status quo by marginalizing women's roles in the labor force
and controlling women through threats of sexual force or physical
violence. Whether a woman is fired for refusing to sleep with her
boss or quits because of abusive treatment by co-workers, the net
result is the same. She is still forced to leave her rightful place as
a wage-earning member of society.
As a complex social phenomenon with multiple causes and
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consequences, sexual harassment cannot be neatly categorized into
two different types. No single criterion exists which distinguishes
one type of sexual harassment from another. As evidenced by re-
cent legal developments, drawing artificial lines renders the law
unable to respond to sexual harassment as women experience it.
Consequently, courts respond to sexual harassment claims in a
mechanical and formalistic fashion. For example, one court com-
mented: "Plaintiff's theory on her sexual harassment claim is
somewhat unfocused. [She] appears to state a hostile environment
cause of action yet clutters the environmental landscape with alle-
gations of retaliation. '230 Courts fail to recognize that women's ex-
periences do not fit into the black and white categories that
currently define sexual harassment. Women's experiences are
complex and "cluttered" with a myriad of circumstances.
VI. A New Approach to the Legal Treatment of Sexual Harassment
Instead of creating types of sexual harassment, courts should
focus on the factors which truly influence harassment of women.
To identify these factors, courts must acknowledge that sexual
harassment is an abuse of sexual and economic power, not an ex-
pression of sexual desire. The judicial perception of sexual harass-
ment must acknowledge that harassment excludes women from
equal participation in the workplace, regardless of the type of
power the harasser abuses or the specific injury the worker suf-
fers. Once courts understand that abuse of power is at the heart of
sexual harassment, legal assessment of the merits of plaintiffs'
sexual harassment claims will properly focus on those aspects of
the employment setting which exacerbate that power. Four cate-
gories are particularly relevant to this assessment: 1) the
harasser's position in the workplace, both economically and per-
sonally; 2) the victim's status and history at work; 3) the treatment
of women workers generally at that workplace; and 4) the history
and policies regarding all types of employee grievances in the
workplace.
The most obvious factor affecting the harasser's economic po-
sition in the workplace hierarchy is his status as a supervisor or
manager. Whether a harasser is a supervisor or co-worker is im-
portant, but only because male supervisors enjoy an added dimen-
sion of power over women workers, not because male co-workers
are without power over their female counterparts. 231 Other as-
230. Ferguson v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 560 F. Supp. 1172, 1197 (D. Del.
1983).
231. This is an important distinction given the commonly held judicial percep-
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pects of workplace dynamics can affect a harasser's ability to wield
power as much as his title or position in a chain of command.
These factors range from the harasser's personality and image in
the company to his age, length of service, marital status, appear-
ance, and personal style.232 All of these subjective factors combine
to determine the force a particular harasser can exert over women
in the workplace.
Along with the harasser's position in the workplace, courts
must consider the plaintiff's status at work as well as her employ-
ment record.233 The respect a woman worker has among her co-
workers and supervisors, either because of her job classification
and performance or her personal style, directly affects her ability
to challenge unwanted sexual attention informally and through of-
ficial channels.234 Courts now require victims to make their dis-
comfort with and dislike of the harassment known to both the
harasser and the employer.23 5 This requirement should not be ret-
roactively imposed on all women workers without an evaluation of
the particular risks a given worker faces in contesting the discrimi-
natory treatment. The victim's status affects more than her ability
to complain; it can also determine the validity an employer will
give her claim. An employee with a negative work record is likely
to face a very different response than one who is not considered a
"troublemaker."23 6 This must be considered by courts who penal-
ize workers for failing to pursue grievances within their
workplace.
Courts must also consider the particular characteristics of the
workplace itself. Foremost, courts must examine the treatment of
women in that workplace: the number of women employed
tion that only supervisors have economic power sufficient to extort favors from wo-
men workers. See supra notes 18-19, 227 and accompanying text.
232. For a general discussion concerning the relationship between sexual harass-
ment and the socioeconomic status of the harasser, see Susan Littler-Bishop,
Doreen Seidler-Feller & Robert Opaluch, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace as a
Function of Initiator's Status: The Case of Airline Personnel, 38 J. Soc. Issues 137
(1982).
233. These factors certainly affect the plaintiff's ability to prove certain ele-
ments of the prima facie case such as causation. If the plaintiff has a poor work
record, it will be difficult to prove that the reason for her economic harm was sex-
ual harassment. Courts must determine whether the plaintiff's poor work record is
a result of the harassment. See supra text accompanying notes 138-141.
234. Each time an employee complains about a condition at work, she faces the
possibility of being disbelieved, harassed, or pegged as a troublemaker. The
strength of an employee's relations and position at work determine both how she
might be received and how likely she is to grieve in the first place.
235. See supra notes 104-121 and accompanying text.
236. See supra note 234.
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there,237 the "clustering" of women in lower status positions, and
any history of sex discrimination or complaints by women work-
ers. Finally, courts should assess other workers' opportunities to
pursue grievances about employment problems.238 This entails an
evaluation of company personnel policies and enforcement mecha-
nisms:239 are there established grievance procedures and if so, do
employees utilize them; is there a management person designated
to hear grievances; and who is that person and what are his or her
skills and abilities? It is important, however, that the legal inquiry
not fixate on rigid conceptions of each category. As courts review
and consider plaintiffs' sexual harassment claims, these categories
should guide, not limit, inquiries concerning the particular dynam-
ics in operation at plaintiffs' workplaces.240
Consideration of these categories properly focuses the inquiry
on the impact sexual harassment has on women workers rather
than on the type of power the harasser abuses. These are the as-
pects of the employment setting which should form the parame-
ters for judicial evaluation of sexual harassment claims. Rather
than asking how the plaintiff behaves in response to the harass-
ment or whether her work performance has notably declined,
courts should examine the totality of plaintiff's situation at work
to assess the impact of this discriminatory behavior.241
Judicial recognition that all sexual harassment, environmen-
tal and quid pro quo, involves both sexual and economic coercion
would also undercut the current rationale for the two standards of
employer liability.242 The harasser's status as a supervisor or co-
237. A woman needs support to cope with sexual harassment on the job. The
number of female co-workers present directly affects the woman's experience of
harassment: how it affects work performance, how quickly or assertively a victim
can/will express her discomfort, how safe it feels to complain.
238. These opportunities are affected not only by policies and procedures, but
also by the atmosphere and spacial design of the workplace. Some questions to ask
include: is there a sense of privacy and confidentiality; are workers allowed access
to management personnel one-on-one; and is there a union.
239. If company policy includes a disciplinary provision, courts must look at how
it has been enforced: is it a fair procedure, or have there been instances of manage-
ment manipulating worker complaints to unfairly harass or discipline co-workers.
See Gordon, supra note 2, at 10-11.
240. How sexual harassment operates in a particular employment setting will
also vary tremendously depending on the type of business the company conducts,
the geographic location of the workplace, the economic position of the company,
and a host of other factors. Courts must be willing to rely on recently developed
understandings of what sexual harassment represents and how various social dy-
namics influence its operation to probe each situation, uncovering the unique and
relevant aspects of plaintiff's situation which allowed her to be victimized by sex-
ual coercion.
241. See supra note 163.
242. See supra text accompanying note 223.
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worker as only one of many factors which affect the harassment's
impact on its victim should not be the basis for defining standards
of liability. Once a plaintiff establishes unwanted sexual harass-
ment by either a co-worker or supervisor, a rebuttable presump-
tion should follow that her working conditions were adversely
affected by the harassment. 243 The burden of proof should shift to
the employer to show that the adverse consequences resulted from
some other legitimate employment practice.244 Only if the em-
ployer meets that burden should the plaintiff be required to prove
the employer's stated reasons are pretextual. Assuming a plaintiff
successfully established the causal link between the harassment
and the negative work consequences, title VII principles of respon-
deat superior should determine employer liability.245 As such, the
employer would be liable unless it showed prompt and effective
remedial action. 246 Plaintiffs should not be required to prove em-
ployer knowledge of a workplace phenomenon which affects the
majority of working women.
Courts must do more than make piecemeal changes in the
way they approach sexual harassment claims; they must recognize
the impact sexual harassment has on women workers and come to
grips with the institutionalized role it plays in the American work
force today. Until the judicial mindset shifts to understand sexual
harassment as a symptom of social norms and not an aberration,
doctrinal changes will continue to fall short of providing new ave-
nues of recovery for working women. Only a transformation in
the legal approach to the problem of sexual harassment will pave
the way for a new legal conception of the complex social tensions
embodied in the experience of sexual harassment.247
243. Rather than placing the initial burden of causation on the plaintiff, sexual
harassment cases should proceed like other employment discrimination cases. Once
the plaintiff makes an initial showing of discriminatory behavior, the connection of
the behavior to the workplace consequences should be presumed unless the em-
ployer produces evidence to the contrary.
244. See supra note 125.
245. This is the standard theoretically applied in quid pro quo claims. See supra
text accompanying notes 194-198.
246. Note that current case law has held true to the requirement of prompt and
remedial action. See supra text accompanying notes 217-219.
247. See supra note 27.
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